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I. INTRODUCTION
Antidiscrimination law and scholarship have long been
engaged in the debate over whether a discriminatory intent or
disparate impact test best captures the type of discrimination the
law should, or can, prohibit.1 This Article suggests that we move
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (emphasizing the
importance of finding both a racially discriminatory purpose and a racially disparate
impact in considering the constitutionality of laws and official acts); Paul Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 22-53 (1976) (reviewing the developing relationship between disparate
impact and discriminatory intent); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-24 (1987)
(urging an abandonment of the doctrine of discriminatory intent in favor of a test that
1470 [41:5
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beyond this dichotomous debate and focus instead on how courts
reason about discrimination cases brought under both the intent
and impact doctrines.! This Article identifies a distinct pattern,
or framework, in the way courts reason about discrimination in
both types of cases that defies neat doctrinal labels. This
reasoning process, which I shorthandedly refer to as "causation,"
is at the heart of evidentiary structures in both intent and impact
actions. Unfortunately, the reigning distinction between
intentional and disparate impact discrimination-an increasingly
blurry one'-has obscured the more important focus on the
element of causation that, in my view, constitutes the normative
core of antidiscrimination law.4 This Article seeks to shift
attention toward this common causal inquiry as a lens into why,
despite the persistence of status-based discrimination,5 so few
discrimination claims (either intent or impact based) are
successful.6
considers unconscious racism by evaluating the potential symbolic message of the
conduct); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARv. L. REV. 493 (2003) (analyzing the conceptual commitments and tension between
equal protection and disparate impact law and promoting disparate impact as the proper
standard for much of antidiscrimination law).
2. Of course, although constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
intentional discrimination remain, the disparate impact cause of action survives only in
civil rights law.
3. See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1069-73 (1998)
(commenting that "the Court's application of the discriminatory intent requirement has
been far from coherent" and examining the disparate approaches that are currently used);
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07
(1989) (stating that the doctrine of intent actually shifts burdens of proof to allow the
judging of substantive outcomes consistent with liberal ideology); Michael Selmi, Proving
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 287,
294 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court employs such a broad definition of
intentional discrimination that it limits its understanding of the doctrine).
4. Notably, others have pointed out that the intent requirement in both
constitutional and statutory law is better understood as a causation requirement. See,
e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SuP. CT.
REV. 145, 152-53 (comparing the Court's inquiry into discriminatory intent with the "but
for" causation of tort and criminal law); Selmi, supra note 3, at 289 (advocating an
approach to answering the question of intent by looking at the potential effect of race on
the decisionmaking process, rather than subjective mental states); Rebecca Hanner White
& Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor
Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 502-505 (2001) (interpreting the
Supreme Court's disparate treatment decisions to show that the Court views the intent
inquiry as a question of causation).
5. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 4, 11-12 (2001) (arguing that race and gender
discrimination in retail sales "is neither a thing of the past" nor limited to the specific
markets regulated by the 1960s civil rights legislation).
6. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals
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By definition, all discrimination claims require plaintiffs to
demonstrate a causal connection between the challenged decision
or outcome and a protected status characteristic.7 That is, when a
plaintiff alleges that she has been discriminated against by a
particular decision or action, she is essentially making a causal
claim about the relationship between her status and that
decision or action. Indeed, this causal link defines the very
essence of prohibited discrimination under both constitutional
and statutory civil rights law. Not all differential treatment of, or
disparate impact on, an individual or group is prohibited by the
law. The prohibition against discrimination is a prohibition
against making decisions or taking actions on account of, or
because of, a status characteristic singled out for protection by
our civil rights laws or constitutional traditions (which generally
include race, gender, nationality, religion, disability, and age).'
Cases involving both intentional and disparate impact
discrimination thus require courts and juries to interrogate
decisionmaking processes and examine their outcomes to assess
the causal link between the plaintiffs status and the challenged
decision or outcome. In intentional cases, a plaintiff must prove
that an individual or group's protected status played a role--
Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 511, 513-17, 566
(2003) (analyzing California jury verdicts in employment discrimination and wrongful
discharge cases from 1998-1999 and concluding that juror bias resulted in substantial
disadvantage for women and minorities).
[Olne can literally count on one hand the number of published [employment
discrimination] decisions in which, after acknowledging the existence of
unconscious bias, the court rules for a race or national origin discrimination
plaintiff or reverses a trial court ruling for the defendant. Many more courts,
after acknowledging the existence in society generally of subtle or unconscious
forms of bias, rule against the disparate treatment plaintiff on the grounds that
she has failed to prove the existence of such bias in her case.
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1169-70
(1995) (footnote omitted).
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (containing Title ViI's "because of"
requirement, which applies to employment discrimination cases).
8. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (stating that
discriminatory intent "implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group" (emphasis added)).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against any individual "because of' that individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). So too does Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
which prohibits housing discrimination "because of' various protected categories. § 3604.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) similarly prohibits discrimination against a
qualified individual "because of" her disability. § 12112(a). Likewise, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1996 (ADEA) prohibits discrimination against an
individual "because of her age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
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perhaps a predominant or determinative one-in the
decisionmaking process that resulted in differential treatment.9
As many commentators have demonstrated, neither conscious
prejudice nor actual animus on the part of the decisionmaker is a
necessary element of intentional discrimination under
constitutional or civil rights law. 0 To prevail in a disparate
impact case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an adverse,
disproportionate impact is brought about by decisionmaking
criteria or practices that operate to harm individuals on the basis
of a protected status characteristic." Under each doctrine, the
9. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1993) (declaring that
the inquiry under Title VII is whether "the [employment] decision was in reality racially
premised"); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating that under the
ADEA, a plaintiff need only prove that her age "played a role in [the decisionmaking]
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 89 (1986) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential
jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group
will be unable impartially to consider the State's case.... ."); see also Thomas v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The ultimate question [in an intentional
action under Title VII] is whether the employee has been treated disparately 'because of
race[,]'... regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the
evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias."); George
Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 127 (1995) (defining
"discrimination" as "a process of noticing or marking a difference, often for evaluative
purposes").
How significant a role the prohibited characteristic must play in order to invalidate
the decision can vary. Compare Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) ("When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor in the decision .... judicial deference is no longer justified." (emphasis
added)), with Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (defining the plaintiffs burden
in a redistricting case as showing that "race was the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular
district" (emphasis added)).
10. See Foster, supra note 3, at 1084-97 (illustrating the assertion that different
degrees of consciousness, ranging from specific intent to unconscious bias, can satisfy the
intent standard in equal protection law); Selmi, supra note 3, at 289 (proposing that the
key inquiry in intentional cases under both constitutional and civil rights law should
"target[] causation, rather than subjective mental states"); D. Don Welch, Removing
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than
Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 (1987) (suggesting that in Title VII disparate
treatment cases the U.S. Supreme Court actually requires "motive," which "is the
underlying [possibly unconscious] cause or reason moving an agent to action," and not
"intent," which "is the conscious purpose with which one acts to effect a desired goal or
result"); White & Krieger, supra note 4, at 500-11 (arguing that the evidentiary
framework developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in intentional employment
discrimination cases under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and similar statutes recognizes
many types of discriminatory motives, including those that operate outside of a
decisionmaker's conscious awareness).
11. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality
opinion) ("[Tihe plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or
promotions because of their membership in a protected group."); see also Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-657 (1989) (adopting Watson's plurality opinion).
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ultimate inquiry is the same: How likely is it that the same
decision would have been made, or the same outcomes would
have resulted, in the absence of the influence of a protected
status characteristic?
The status categories protected under antidiscrimination
law are often ones that carry a history of pervasive
mistreatment, bias, stereotype, social stigma, or persistent
disadvantage. 2 Discrimination claims require courts to evaluate
whether and how the indicia (or markers) historically associated
with these social statuses have influenced particular
decisionmaking processes and outcomes in either express or
subtle ways. 3 The manner in which courts go about this
evaluative exercise ultimately gives content and meaning to the
term discrimination, at least as a juridical matter. For that
reason, this Article carefully examines the methodology
employed by courts to discern whether an adverse decision or
outcome more likely than not resulted from the influence of
indicia historically associated with status-based discrimination
(prejudice, stereotyping, et cetera).
This examination reveals that courts in intent and impact
actions share a common way of reasoning about discrimination
and, in particular, about the causal inquiry at the heart of
discrimination claims. Both intent and impact causes of action
are premised on a three-step process of causal inquiry: status
inference, neutral explanation, and causal attribution. The
plaintiff is expected to introduce status (for example, race or
gender) as a possible explanation for the contested decision or
outcome. This introduction creates a practical, and often legal,
imperative for the defendant to explain its decision or the
outcome in status-neutral terms. The factfinder must then decide
whether the decision or outcome is more likely attributable to
status influences or to the neutral explanation offered by the
defendant. Once status influence has been found, the
decisionmaker must justify the discriminatory decision; however,
this justification occurs only after the causal inquiry has been
satisfied. 4
12. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2000) (examining how American antidiscrimination law has
progressed as it has sought to reverse widespread, pervasive prejudice).
13. Refer to Part III.A infra.
14. In other words, the decisionmaker's "explanation" is different from its ultimate
"justification" for a discriminatory decision. The causation inquiry precedes the
justification stage. In both intent and impact cases, once the factfinder concludes that
status has influenced or caused the decisionmaking process to occur, the decision may
nevertheless survive, as discussed below, if the decisionmaker can justify it by reference
1474 [41:5
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This three-step causal inquiry is itself based in and reliant
upon two types of reasoning processes-counterfactual and
contrastive thinking-that social scientists have found dominate
causal determinations.6 For instance, when asking "if X did not
occur (or was not present), how likely is it that Y would have
happened?" individuals tend both to employ the "what ifs" of
counterfactual reasoning in order to evaluate the influence of
certain aspects of the occurrence and simultaneously to engage in
contrastive reasoning to compare the occurrence with similar
to a "business necessity" or a "compelling state interest," or by a showing that the same
decision or outcome would have been made had status not been an influence. This Article
does not focus on those types of justifications.
For example, in disparate impact cases, the defendant can only save its criteria or
practices that caused the status-based disparate impact if they are truly necessary or
essential to achieving the goals or purposes sought by the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (mandating that defendants have the burden to prove "that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity"). Even if the defendant succeeds in making this showing, the defendant can
still be liable if the plaintiff demonstrates the availability of a less discriminatory
alternative business practice or criteria that the defendant has refused to adopt. §.2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (codifying the "business
necessity" justification in employment discrimination law under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). Most other civil rights statutes-housing, age, and disability
nondiscrimination acts-use the same basic structure as Title VII. See, e.g., Town of
Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1988); Christopher P.
McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment
Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 563-67, 606
(1986).
Similarly, in intentional cases, the defendant has a chance to justify status-
influenced decisions either by demonstrating that there is a compelling state interest in
the decision or that the same decision would have been made had the factor been absent.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-20 (1995) (stating that once a plaintiff shows
that race is the "predominant" motive behind a redistricting decision, the legislature must
justify the use of race by a compelling state interest); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,
228 (1985) ("[Olnce racial discrimination is shown to have been a 'substantial' or'motivating' factor behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law's defenders
to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor."); Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (commenting
that the decision will not be deemed unconstitutional even if it is based on a status like
race if the defendant can show that it would have made the same decision had the
impermissible factor not played a role; when this can be established, "the complaining
party... [can] no longer fairly... attribute the injury complained of to improper
consideration of a discriminatory purpose"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2000)
(precluding damages to a plaintiff in intentional disparate treatment cases if the
defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have treated the
plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiffs status had played no role in the employment
decision). But see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-102 (2003) (holding that
the plaintiff is not required to present direct evidence of discrimination in mixed motive
cases for a reasonable jury to conclude that status was a motivating factor).
15. See generally Ann L. McGill & Jill G. Klein, Contrastive and Counterfactual
Reasoning in Causal Judgment, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 897 (1993)
(analyzing research on the role of both contrastive and counterfactual reasoning in causal
attribution).
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occurrences as a way to identify possible explanatory factors. 6
These two reasoning processes not only permeate causal thinking
but are also shaped by various influences-normative
expectations and cognitive biases, for example-that critically
shape these processes and can have a determinative role on
causal attributions. 1
7
Beyond illustrating this common causal element, a close
examination of these two reasoning processes in
antidiscrimination law provides a window into understanding
why, despite the existence of generous evidentiary mechanisms,
intent and impact actions have ceased being a viable avenue of
relief for discrimination plaintiffs. In particular, this Article
illustrates that the causal inquiry at the heart of evidentiary
structures in both intent and impact actions has, over time,
become vulnerable in two respects.
First, these evidentiary structures are deeply vulnerable to
attribution mistakes that may occur as a result of unconscious
stereotypes and cognitive biases that can distort the causal
attribution judgments by legal decisionmakers and factfinders.
Current psychological research suggests that unconscious biases
and cognitive stereotypes account for much of modern day
discrimination." Legal decisionmakers and factfinders are not
likely to detect these biases either in themselves or in others
when evaluating discrimination claims. 9  This Article
demonstrates how the same cognitive biases that give rise to
discrimination in society can also distort causal judgments about
that discrimination. This danger is embedded in the evidentiary
frameworks governing intent and impact cases, which allow the
causal inquiry underlying discrimination claims to be determined
16. Refer to Part II.A, .C infra.
17. Refer to Part II.B infra.
18. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2002) ("The behavior of real human
beings is often guided by racial and other stereotypes of which they are completely
unaware."); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 753-54 (2001) (acknowledging
that contemporary forms of bias are not as pronounced as those traditionally
contemplated by antidiscrimination laws, rendering our current legal models an
"impediment to addressing the new forms of bias"); Krieger, supra note 6, at 1187-88
(describing how some types of cognitive processing can lead to stereotyping); Lawrence,
supra note 1, at 317 (discussing the psychological underpinnings of modem-day
discrimination).
19. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White
Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995) (arguing that transparently
white decisionmaking consists of the unconscious use of decisionmaking criteria that are
more strongly associated with whites than nonwhites and that these criteria and norms
are apt to be interpreted as race neutral rather than as covertly race specific).
1476 [41:5
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by contrastive reasoning exercises-for example, explanations
seeking to distinguish disparately treated and affected
individuals and groups-that invite reliance on the very
stereotypical categorization structures at the root of status
discrimination. Many discrimination claims fail because courts
are uneven at best-and often neglectful-in evaluating these
explanations against existing antidiscrimination norms and
current understandings about cognitive prejudice and bias.
There is, however, a deeper vulnerability in the evidentiary
structure of antidiscrimination law that is more destabilizing to
the causal inquiry that lies at its center. This vulnerability is the
erosion of certain normative presumptions that underlie the
evidentiary structures in intent and impact cases. The U.S.
Supreme Court has rooted its evidentiary frameworks in a set of
normative assumptions about the existence, operation, and
prevalence of status discrimination in our society.2" Based on
these assumptions, the Court has enabled plaintiffs to establish
an inference of discrimination (or status influence) by employing
a counterfactual heuristic that imagines what decisionmaking
processes and outcomes would look like in a world free of
discrimination. The Court then considers deviations from those
processes and outcomes to be evidence of discrimination."
However, despite the formal retention of these evidentiary
structures over time, there has been a steady erosion of the
normative assumptions underlying them.22 The erosion of these
presumptions has had a correspondingly devastating impact on
the ability of plaintiffs to prove status discrimination, especially
given the increasing temporal distance from the worst and most
overt forms of discrimination, the increasing subtle and
structural nature of discrimination, and the shift in public
attitudes regarding the existence of status bias.22
This analysis, then, calls into question the belief among civil
rights advocates that survival of the disparate impact cause of
action and the dismantling of the intent standard will preserve
the civil rights gains of the past.24 Although certainly these two
20. Refer to Part III infra (discussing the Court's reliance on such normative
assumptions).
21. Refer Part III.A infra.
22. Refer to Part V infra.
23. Refer to Part V infra (attributing the difficulty in proving discrimination to the
Court's decreasing faith in normative assumptions).
24. See L. Camille Hbert, Redefining the Burdens of Proof in Title VII Litigation:
Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?,
32 B.C. L. REV. 1, 88-90 (1990) (arguing that the disparate impact theory is necessary to
guarantee fair treatment of minorities in the employment context).
2005] 1477
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steps would appear to stem the "rollback" of these gains, they
would ultimately prove to be insufficient and unsatisfactory.25
Unless this understanding changes in the near future, courts will
continue to be an inhospitable forum for discrimination victims,
and no amount of doctrinal reform will significantly alter the
odds that the court will "see" the increasingly subtle and
sophisticated nature of contemporary discrimination.
This Article's analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part II of the
Article reviews the social-psychological literature for insight into
how causal judgments are made, specifically to explicate the
mechanisms involved in, and influential factors on, causal
thought processes. This research has found, not surprisingly,
that causal judgments are affected by the knowledge, biases, and
motivations that individuals bring to the process. Although much
of the way that individuals reason about causal judgments in
everyday life is automatic, causal judgments are vulnerable to
unconscious and deeply entrenched cognitive biases. These biases
are particularly pronounced when making causal judgments
regarding the relationship between social status characteristics
such as race and gender and targeted or challenged decisions and
outcomes. More particularly, researchers find that individuals
readily accept explanations for actions and outcomes involving
status groups that tend to coincide with stereotyped
categorization structures for those groups. This tendency results
from insufficient weight being given to these cognitive structures
in causal reasoning processes and not enough emphasis being
placed on scrutinizing or evaluating these structures against real
differences between the groups. In order to reduce causal
attribution mistakes where these characteristics are at issue,
social scientists find that when causal inquiries place the
particular social status at the focus of evaluation-for example, a
25. Since its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court
has yet to find disparate impact discrimination, and lower federal courts have not had
much better success. Selmi, supra note 3, at 286-87 (describing the evolution of
discrimination law since Griggs). The combination of the tightening of evidentiary
standards to prove disparate impact and the increasing willingness of the Court (and
lower courts) to accept almost any explanation or justification for those impacts has
effectively shut this theory down as a practical matter. See id. at 287 n.31 (explaining
that courts have demonstrated a "strong willingness to accept a defendant's justification
for the challenged practice"); see also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red
Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1487, 1491-93 & n.18 (1996) (noting that tightening the standards for defining the
relevant population baseline increasingly blurs the distinction between disparate impact
and disparate treatment); Krieger, supra note 6, at 1243 (pointing out that the levels of




type of counterfactual heuristic-it reduces reliance on
stereotypical cognitive structures and results in more accurate
causal judgments.
Part III illustrates that evidentiary frameworks in both
intent and impact cases reflect the two predominant reasoning
processes-counterfactual and contrastive-that social scientists
have demonstrated are central to the formation of causal
judgments. Through a counterfactual "heuristic," the Court
allows an inference of status influence from circumstantial
evidence that normally would not be indicative of discrimination
but that becomes salient based on a set of normative assumptions
about the way discrimination operates in our society. Contrastive
reasoning, too, is central to the evidentiary frameworks in both
intent and impact cases, as evidenced by the ubiquity of the"similarly situated" analysis and its focus on identifying
distinctions between disparately treated or impacted individuals
or populations. Defendants (and courts) rely heavily on this
similarly situated heuristic not only to rebut the inference of
status influence-for example, by generating plausible neutral
explanations for the challenged decision or outcomes-but also to
reason whether there is status influence in the first place.
Similarly situated, contrastive analysis can also assist a plaintiff
in reaffirming the inference of status influence by showing that
she is similarly situated to a population or individual who was
treated more favorably.
Part IV examines how the evidentiary frameworks in intent
and impact cases are vulnerable to the cognitive biases that can
distort causal judgments. This vulnerability arises from the
tendency for comparative or contrastive reasoning, such as in the
similarly situated analysis, to dominate causal judgments.
Courts are too accepting and hesitant to criticize explanations for
disparate treatments or impacts generated by such reasoning. As
the social science research cautions, comparative analysis
emphasizes the sufficiency versus the necessity of a causal factor
because it focuses on identifying any distinctive feature between
the challenged occurrence and a contrasting occurrence as
possible explanations. This type of reasoning is also more subject
to cognitive biases because of the tendency to consciously or
subconsciously rely upon what many believe are natural or
innate characteristics of certain status groups, or certain
phenomena associated with status groups, that distinguish them
from more favorably treated or impacted groups. As such, the
predominance of this type of reasoning in causal attribution often
leads to incomplete causal judgments in antidiscrimination law.
In other words, there is a tendency to sidestep the normative
2005] 1479
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work required of the causal inquiry in antidiscrimination law-
for example, in evaluating the various ways that status can
influence or bias decisionmakers and outcomes-and attribute
stereotype-consistent or subtle discriminatory explanations to
neutral causes of a challenged decision or event. Thus, when
contrastive analysis is allowed to dominate causal judgments
about discrimination, those judgments are rendered vulnerable
to the very cognitive biases and discriminatory influences that
antidiscrimination law is designed to prohibit.
Part V illustrates a much deeper causal vulnerability in
antidiscrimination law, marked by the erosion of the normative
understandings underlying the evidentiary frameworks in intent
and impact cases. This Part takes a close look at the reasoning of
recent cases in the Court's equal protection and civil rights
jurisprudence to identify where this erosion has occurred. The
Court's most recent jurisprudence illustrates a significant
weakening of three presumptions that have supported its
evidentiary frameworks in intent and impact cases: the
presumption of historical saliency, the presumption of group
parity, and the presumption of persistent bias threat. Thus, even
if courts could somehow control and contain the cognitive biases
that threaten to seep into the evidentiary frameworks, as
indicated in Part IV, there would continue to be a huge gap
between the reality of status discrimination and its juridical
recognition.
II. REASONING ABOUT CAUSATION: ENDOGENOUS AND
EXOGENOUS INFLUENCES
As one philosopher has described it, causation is "the cement
of the universe" because it binds together events that might
otherwise appear unrelated.2" In much of the law and in life,
when we ask whether X caused Y, we are asking about the
relationship between these two events or variables, an inquiry
undoubtedly influenced by our beliefs about and experiences in
the world. 7 The "science" of causation-how we determine cause
and effect-is a multidisciplinary field that is influenced by
philosophy, psychology, and social psychology." This Part relies
26. DAviD HuME, AN ABSTRACT OF A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 32 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1938) (1740).
27. See id. at 11-15 (describing the inferences about causation that may be drawn
by observing the movement of billiard balls).
28. See Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Counterfactual Thinking: A Critical
Overview, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL
THINKING 1, 2-6 (Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson eds., 1995) [hereinafter WHAT MIGHT
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upon the latest social-psychological research-which itself draws
heavily upon the other disciplines-to understand the
endogenous and exogenous influences that shape causal
assessments and tend to alter people's causal attributions.
According to this research, two types of reasoning permeate
causal judgments (counterfactual and contrastive thinking), and
they are affected by various external influences that can shape
and distort them.29
A. Endogenous Influences: Counterfactual and Contrastive
Reasoning
1. Counterfactual "Mutations" of Expected Outcomes and
Factors. Beliefs about how an occurrence came about are affected
by expectations of what might have been, created by the "what
ifs" and "if onlys" of counterfactual thinking.0 Counterfactual
thinking is a process of imagining alternatives to one or more
features of an occurrence.3 People construct counterfactuals
to test whether a particular event or factor was a necessary cause
of the examined occurrence or outcome. For example, to
determine whether a factor (X) is a necessary cause of an
outcome (Y), one may construct a counterfactual that negates the
factor X (-X).32 The easier one imagines -X, followed by the
negation of Y (-Y), the stronger one should believe that X was
necessary to cause Y. 33 Simply stated, counterfactual reasoning is
the query of whether Y would have resulted if X was different; for
HAVE BEEN] (considering various intellectual perspectives of counterfactual thinking).
The aim of philosophy is to develop empirical tests that remove all irrational reasoning
from descriptions of causation and determine the objective truth of an occurrence's cause.
See id. at 2-3 (discussing philosophy's historical roots). Psychologists research how the
mind functions when individuals determine a given cause of an occurrence. Id. at 4. Social
psychology, in contrast, builds upon the heuristics developed by philosophy and
psychology by prescribing experimental subjects to engage in causal analysis and then
assessing how their decisionmaking is influenced by the broader social context. Id. at 5-6.
29. See, e.g., David R. Mandel & Darrin R. Lehman, Counterfactual Thinking and
Ascriptions of Cause and Preventability, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 450, 460
(1996) (studying the role that counterfactuals play in causation determinations); McGill &
Klein, supra note 15, at 903-04 (testing hypotheses directed at both counterfactual and
contrastive reasoning in causation determinations).
30. See, e.g., DAVID K LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS 1-4 (1973); J.L. MACKIE, THE
CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 29-34 (1974) (analyzing the concept of
causation and indicating the inherent difficulties in counterfactual reasoning).
Counterfactual analysis is a technique predominantly developed by philosophers Lewis
and Mackie to examine methods of causal inference, which have since been elaborated
upon by the psychological and social-psychological communities.





example, whether I would have been late (Y) if I had taken the
bus (-X) rather than the subway (X)."4 Counterfactual inquiry
thus focuses on an event and then negates some characteristic of
the event to analyze its effect on the outcome. In fields such as
law and history, where causal attribution is essential yet
scientific experimentation is not possible, counterfactual analysis
is an accepted and ubiquitous means of inferring causation. 5
For several decades, researchers have found a strong
correlation between the alteration, or negation, of a factor via
counterfactual inquiry-a phenomenon called "mutation"--and
the attribution of causal blame to the mutated factor.36 Norm
theory, one very influential explanation of counterfactual
thinking, explains that when a person observes an occurrence,
she undergoes a mental comparison between the actual
occurrence and "the norm occurrence" to identify violations of
expectancies, with the effect of restoring abnormal events back to
the norm.37 Norm theory proposes that a person's mental
representation of an occurrence can be counterfactually modified
in many ways through mutating factors. 8 The norm occurrence is
what the person expects would happen throughout the event. In
general, expected or typical factors involved in an occurrence are
particularly resistant to counterfactual mutation, while other
factors perceived by an individual as atypical are more mutable. 9
34. See id. (reasoning that one may attribute taking a particular route home as the
cause of an auto accident).
35. See H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 103-08 (1959)
(applying counterfactual analysis to legal causation to determine whether an act or
omission was the sine qua non of the result or injury); J.D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and
Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, 43 WORLD POL. 169, 169 (1991) (arguing that
counterfactuals "play a necessary and fundamental... role in efforts of political scientists
to assess their hypotheses about the causes of the phenomena they study"); Robert N.
Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 343-45 (1992)
(chronicling the methodology of counterfactual statements in the law in order to make
sensible use of them).
36. See Gary L. Wells & Igor Gavanski, Mental Simulation of Causality, 56 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 167 (1989) (discussing how causal blame is attributed
to counterfactually mutated factors); see also Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm
Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136, 143 (1986) (finding
that subjects who read a story of a car accident and were asked how the accident could
have been avoided tended to mutate antecedents they believed would undo the outcome
and to attribute causality to those antecedents).
37. See Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 6-7 (explaining that norm theory describes
the mental processes that occur when a person is surprised by an abnormal outcome). The
norm is created in direct response to the actual occurrence and is a combination of beliefs,
expectancies, and desires derived from past experience shaded by the outcome of the
present experience. See id. at 7 ("The particular character of each norm is a combination
of a priori beliefs reconstructed uniquely in light of a specific outcome.").
38. See id.
39. See Kahneman & Miller, supra note 36, at 143 (finding that test subjects who
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Thus, unexpected factors are highly susceptible to mutation and
more subject to causal attribution.
For example, Andy always calls Betty to pick him up from
school at 2:30 p.m. Andy also always asks Betty to bring a snack
for him. Betty always arrives to pick up Andy at 3:00 p.m. with a
snack. One day, Andy does not call at 2:30 but rather at 2:45 and
asks Betty to bring him a snack. That day, Betty does not pick
Andy up at 3:00. Assuming that Andy does not have any other
information to explain why Betty was late, he may observe the
outcome of not getting picked up, examine what was atypical in
the occurrence-his calling at 2:45-and counterfactually mutate
the 2:45 call, replacing it with a 2:30 call, and ascribe causality to
the tardiness of the call.4°
On the other hand, actual events that are consistent with
expected ones are less susceptible to mutation. For example,
although Betty's acquisition of the snack and not the tardiness of
the call may have been the actual cause of the delay, Andy would
have difficulty mutating the request for the snack because it was
consistent with the expected event. The principle that
exceptional events are preferentially mutated is evident in other
tendencies or rules that occur as part of counterfactual
reasoning. For instance, in addition to unexpected events that
are prone to be highly susceptible to mutation, individuals are
also more likely to mutate through counterfactual analysis
(1) actions rather than inactions,4' (2) controllable factors rather
were asked to mutate antecedents in a scenario of a man getting into a car accident after
leaving work primarily mutated antecedents that deviated from his normal routine, for
example, taking an alternative route home or stopping for groceries).
40. See Ann L. McGill, Selection of a Causal Background: Role of Expectation Versus
Feature Mutability, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 705 (1993).
41. Id. at 138 (citing Kahneman & Miller, supra note 36, and Dale T. Miller et al.,
Counterfactual Thinking and Social Perception: Thinking About What Might Have Been,
23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 305 (1990)). But see Christopher G. Davis
et al., The Undoing of Traumatic Life Events, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
109, 115, 121 (1995) (suggesting that distinguishing between commissions and omissions
(actions and inactions) was "not critical for [individuals]"). Generally, human action is
considered exceptional when compared with an omission to act. Although in certain
circumstances an omission may be viewed as unusual-for example, when a parent omits
to care for his child-generally studies have shown that inaction is the expected norm and
therefore less susceptible to mutation. See Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following
Action and Inaction: Affective Responses to Positive Versus Negative Outcomes, 13
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 529 (1987) (noting that test subjects find
action more salient than inaction). For example, in a car accident between A and B, where
A turns into B's car while B is driving straight, a witness engaged in causal reasoning
would more readily mutate A's turn into B than B's omission to slow down as a
contributing factor to the accident. Although B going straight could be described as a
positive action that contributed to the accident, B's omission to slow down is a less
obvious factor for people to mutate. Omissions can be categorized as static and actions as
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than uncontrollable factors,42 and (3) dynamic rather than
constant or static factors.43
2. Contrastive Reasoning and the Search for Comparative
Information. Although most research on causal thinking
identifies counterfactual reasoning as a crucial and common
attribution tool, other research has emphasized the importance of
contrastive thinking in forming causal judgments.4 Contrastive
thinking is a process by which "people identify causal
explanations by contrasting the target event (e.g., the employee
who failed) with instances in which the event did not occur
(e.g., other employees who succeeded).' 5 Distinctive factors
dynamic, which relate directly to the third tendency rule. This rule relates to norm theory
and the first rule of exceptional mutation as well. See Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 32
(concluding that dynamic factors are more mutable than static factors).
42. See Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 31-32 (citing studies demonstrating the
higher mutability of controllable factors). "Factors that change in the external world are
more easily altered in mental representations. ... " Id. at 32. Examples of dynamic
factors include effort and fortuity. See id. at 33. Examples of static or constant factors are
inherent ability and laws of nature-for example, gravity and laws of motion. See id. In
attributing cause to outcomes relating to sports,, experiments have shown that subjects
mutate the effort of the players more often than their ability. See Vittorio Girotto et al.,
Event Controllability in Counterfactual Thinking, 78 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 111, 128-129
(1991). People do not expect that the laws of nature, or the intrinsic ability of people, will
change over time. See Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 32 ("Thus, unstable factors such
as effort should be more mutable than stable factors such as ability.").
Norm theory posits that when an individual compares an actual event with her
imagined norm event, a discrepancy in antecedents between the norm and actual will only
arise between factors that are dynamic in the real world. See id. at 32-33. Events
involving constant factors will be identical in a person's actual and imagined
representations. Id. Using the first hypothetical in which Andy calls Betty to pick him up
from school, Andy will more likely have an expected norm that Betty forgot (a person's
memory being a dynamic feature) to pick him up than an expected norm that Betty
suddenly lost the ability to drive her car (ability being far more static and constant). The
dynamic-static distinction relates to the final rule of preference of controllable and
uncontrollable antecedents. Id.
43. See Girotto et al., supra note 42, at 111-33; Miller et al., supra note 41. This
finding is consistent with philosophical and motivational theories that suggest that
individuals prefer ascribing causality to factors of human agency rather than situational
conditionals. See generally 2 THOMAS REID, Of the Liberty of Moral Agents, in THE WORKS
OF THOMAS REID, D.D. 599 (Sir William Hamilton ed., 8th ed., James Thin 1895) (1846);
see also Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 32.
44. McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 897.
45. Id. Note that the concept called the "Method of Difference" developed by John
Stewart Mill in 1843 bears great similarity to contrastive analysis. See JOHN STUART
MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 256 (Longmans, Green & Co.
1949) (1843). Via the Method of Difference reasoning, if a phenomenon always occurs in
the presence of X and not when X is absent, all other things being equal, the perceiver
may feel confident in stating that X is the causal factor in the occurrence of the
phenomenon. Id. Unique occurrences with unique factual makeups too may utilize the
method of difference, although the perceiver must look for general thematic similarities
across varied results. For example, murders, regardless of to whom they happen,
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between the event in question and the contrasting events become
possible causal explanations. 46 The distinctive factors generated
by this comparison are often based on statistical comparative
data, general a priori worldviews, and memory or knowledge of
47similar occurrences.
Take a tangible example of a basketball tournament in
which Michael Jordan plays for the Bulls, who win the
tournament. To determine if Michael Jordan was a sufficient
cause for the win, an individual would examine past tournaments
comparing when the Bulls lost. If the Bulls lost when Michael
Jordan played, then Michael Jordan's playing cannot alone be a
sufficient cause for the Bulls' victory. If, however, in all instances
in which the Bulls lost, Michael Jordan did not play, then one
would conclude that Michael Jordan was a sufficient cause of the
Bulls' success.
Researchers have shown that contrastive and counterfactual
reasoning "may correspond to different types of causal
judgments." s  Counterfactual thinking involves assessing
whether a factor is among those that influence an occurrence,
while contrastive thinking involves identifying factors that
distinguish an occurrence from contrasting background factors.49
In other words, contrastive reasoning is employed when
individuals are confronted with an explanation-focused
question-"What caused Y?"--whereas counterfactual reasoning
is employed when individuals are confronted with evaluative-
focused questions-"Did X cause Y?"5o Counterfactual reasoning,
by focusing on instances in which a particular factor is absent,
thus emphasizes the necessity of that factor to the outcome. 1
This differs from contrastive reasoning, which focuses on
instances in which the effect is absent, and thereby emphasizes
the sufficiency of the factor.52
generally occur when the killer has a motive, thereby establishing that motive plays a
causal role in murder. See MACKIE, supra note 30, at 72-73 (explaining Mill's Method of
Difference theory).
46. McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 897.
47. Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 7.
48. McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 898.
49. See generally Dennis J. Hilton, Conversational Processes and Causal
Explanations, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 65 (1990); McGill, supra note 40, at 701-07; Ann L.
McGill, The Effect of Direction of Comparison on Selection of Causal Explanations, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (1990).
50. McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 897-99.
51. Id. at 897.
52. Id. at 898 (citing D.J. Hilton & I.C. Knott, Explanatory Relevance: Pragmatic
Constraints on the Selection of Causes from Conditions (1992) (unpublished manuscript)).
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For example, using contrastive reasoning to determine
whether being a woman is sufficient for failure to slam-dunk a
basketball, one needs to examine statistics or one's own a priori
world knowledge to determine whether the factor of female
gender has ever been present with the activity of slam-dunking a
basketball. If a female has slam-dunked a basketball before, then
female gender is not a sufficient cause of one female actor's
inability to slam-dunk. Thus, like counterfactual reasoning,
contrastive reasoning also involves a type of "mutation." But the
difference is that in counterfactual reasoning, the causal factor
(such as status) is mutated-would the player have failed to
slam-dunk the basketball if she were not a woman. Whereas in
contrastive reasoning, the outcome or effect (for example, the
adverse outcome) is mutated-What made the difference between
instances in which the basketball was slam-dunked and those in
which it was not? 3
Contrastive reasoning can produce a combination of factors
that may have contributed to the occurrence. For instance, in
comparing circumstances in which an employee was fired and
other employees were not, "social outcomes, such as poor
employee performance, may also result from a configuration of
factors, for example, gender of the employee, type of supervision,
company culture, technical support, and so forth."54 Learning the
universe of factors sufficient to produce poor employee
performance is the byproduct of contrastive reasoning.55
However, a further counterfactual step is usually required to
evaluate the likelihood that one or more of the possible factors
are attributable to the decision. This step removes each factor
(including gender) to determine how likely it is that the employee
would have failed without the influence of the factor. 6
B. Exogenous Influences: The Role of Motivation, Bias, and
Knowledge
1. Influences on Counterfactual Mutation. Personal
motivation, bias, and knowledge affect an individual's choice of
mutation when reasoning counterfactually about causation.
Counterfactual inquiry is a fairly automatic process, but is
nevertheless susceptible to influence by various motivations,






biases, and knowledge in two ways. First, biases, misconceptions,
and knowledge may unconsciously influence the automatic
mutation process.57 Second, the mutation process may be slowed
down by the individual's conscious exertion of control over
selection of mutation factors consistent with her biases or
motivational concerns. 8
a. Unconscious Influences on Mutation. Norm theory posits
that individuals create an imagined scenario while processing an
actual occurrence.59 People examine differences between the
actual and the imagined scenarios to select unexpected, active,
controllable, and dynamic factors for mutation. ° A person's world
knowledge and bias unconsciously affect what he or she views as
unexpected versus normal, active versus passive, controllable
versus uncontrollable, and dynamic versus static.6' Therefore,
during representation formation and mutation selection, an
individual's knowledge and bias affect his counterfactual
analysis. The following are a few examples of how unconscious
bias and knowledge can permeate the counterfactual inquiry and
mutation process.
Typical factors can be mistaken for unexpected ones, thus
causing an individual to mutate and attribute causality
mistakenly. For example, an American who is ignorant of British
driving conventions visits London and witnesses a head-on
collision with one driver on the left side of the road and one on
the right side of the road in the same lane. The American,
thinking the person driving on the left was the unexpected actor,
would unconsciously mutate the left driver's action and ascribe
him causal blame. Unwittingly, the American would be guilty of
allowing his misconception (that driving on the right side of the
road is proper) to cause a wrongful attribution of blame.62
Dynamic factors can be erroneously perceived as static and
cause an individual to attribute causation to the wrong agents.
57. Eric P. Seelau et al., Counterfactual Constraints, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN,
supra note 28, at 57, 65-71.
58. See id. at 62.
59. Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 6-7.
60. Refer to Part II.A. 1 supra.
61. See generally Seelau et al., supra note 57 (analyzing the techniques used in
selecting which factors to mutate).
62. Because counterfactual mutation is reliant upon knowledge of the occurrence, if
one has incorrect or inadequate knowledge of an event this will lead to limited or faulty
causal attribution. See generally Gary L. Well et al., The Undoing of Scenarios, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 421 (1987) (finding that test respondents did not mutate
character actions absent from express factual accounts in experimental scenarios,
demonstrating that knowledge was an attenuating factor on subject mutation).
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Professor McGill cites an example of citizens living under a
historically corrupt political rule. These societies tend to"characterize the abuse and torture of fellow citizens as the
result of agitation on the part of the victim rather than the
product of a political system gone awry." 3 Hence, society
members' ability to ascribe the cause of their anguish to tyranny
is handicapped by their perception that the government is a
static entity unable to change its unjust ways. Rather, it is easier
to see the victim's acts as causal because they are perceived as
dynamic and capable of change.64
Motivation, too, affects the process of mutation at the
unconscious level.65 The base evolutionary tendency to exert
control over one's environment can easily motivate one to
erroneously choose certain factors for mutation and can lead to
attribution errors." In other words, people are generally
motivated to focus on controllable events in assigning causation
to avoid negative outcomes in the future. If causal inquiries
centered on uncontrollable situational events, people would tend
to perceive negative outcomes as unavoidable and would not be
able to prepare for them. For example, when someone dies of
frostbite, people are intrinsically motivated to attribute causality
to his failure to dress appropriately or to other imprudent actions
rather than to harsh weather. This attribution provides
individuals with the opportunity to avoid the same results in the
future, as well as peace of mind that they are not "at the mercy of
seemingly fickle events in the environment."67 This motivation
can easily lead to the mutation of individual actions before
mutation of uncontrollable conditions.68 As such, individual
actions are often blamed for injuries that may have been
unavoidable due to conditional causes. For example, if Johann
slipped and fell on a slippery floor, the tendency of most people
would be to mutate first a characteristic of Johann (for example,
her clumsiness) as opposed to a chance condition of the floor.6"
63. Ann L. McGill, Context Effects in Judgments of Causation, 57 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 198 (1989).
64. Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 33.
65. See BERNARD WEINER, AN AwrRIBUTIONAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND
EMOTION 2-6 (1986) (asserting that mastery of one's environment has been theorized as
the base evolutionary purpose of counterfactual thought).
66. Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
311, 313, 322-27 (1975).
67. FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 257 (1958).
68. See Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 31-32 (explaining how people focus on
controllable behaviors in order to navigate toward desired outcomes).
69. This phenomenon is known as the illusion of control. See Langer, supra note 66,
at 311-13 (noting that skill tasks. involving personal action and familiar objects are
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b. Conscious Impact of Motivation, Bias, and Knowledge.
In addition to biases that unconsciously pervade the
counterfactual process, individuals may consciously bias their
counterfactual attribution and assignment of causality for
various reasons, including outright bias against certain groups.
For instance, when researchers in one study directed its subjects'
counterfactual inquiries toward a specific purpose-for example,
the creation of counterfactuals to determine who is blameworthy
for a crime-they observed that the subjects' counterfactual
thought process slowed down, became a conscious process, and
was influenced by their motivation, knowledge, and bias.°
Individuals with racist tendencies have been shown to assign
causality to the group they disfavor, regardless of what factors
they initially mutated.7'
Furthermore, individuals may consciously mutate certain
factors in an effort to save themselves from blame. 72 Experiments
that placed the research subject in a storyline, implicating the
subject in an unpleasant event, demonstrated that the subjects
selectively mutated certain factors in order to blame others.73
Other findings demonstrated that subjects mutated situational
rather than personal factors for events in which an actor similar
to the subjects was observed doing wrongful behavior.74 In
contrast, where research subjects differed from the target actors,
they tended to mutate the target actors' behavior and then
situations in which one's control is likely to be overestimated).
70. See Christopher T. Burris & Nyla R. Branscombe, Racism, Counterfactual
Thinking, and Judgment Severity, 23 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 980, 992 (1993)
(finding that subjects with heavy racist dispositions did not alter their mutations to
satisfy their racist leanings, as norm theory might predict, but did assign more blame to
members of the disfavored race). One study suggests that stereotypes and biases also
influence causal attribution. See George I. Whitehead III et al., The Effect of Subject's
Race and Other's Race on Judgments of Causality for Success and Failure, 50 J.
PERSONALITY 193, 200-01 (1982). Individuals who judged others from different status
groups attributed the others' failure at a task more frequently to lack of inherent ability
while attributing failures of the same status group to lack of effort or luck. Id. at 201.
71. Burris & Branscombe, supra note 70, at 991-93.
72. See Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Self-Esteem and Counterfactual Thinking,
65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 199, 199-200 (1993) (explaining that mutating one's
own actions in response to a negative outcome is "conceptually similar to denying
responsibility for failure").
73. Id. at 200-04 (finding that individuals with high self-esteem tended to assume
credit for success and blame others for failure).
74. See Neal J. Roese et al., Perceived Similarity and Defensive Counterfactual
Thinking: Evidence for Motivational Determinants of Counterfactual Content 5, 9 (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Houston Law Review) ("When subjects saw
themselves as similar to the perpetrator, they tended to mutate situational factors.");
Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 26 (concluding that participants were more likely to
mutate aspects of the situation than actions by the perpetrator).
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ascribed them blame.75 The researchers hypothesized that this
could be due to a "self-serving bias" causing purposeful
manipulation of counterfactual mutations."
2. Influences on Contrastive Thinking. Contrastive analysis
is particularly susceptible to distortion from differences in
motivation, cognitive biases, and faulty background knowledge.
As explained, the use of comparative or "covariation" information
is critical to generating causal explanations for contrastive
reasoning." However, a contrasting characteristic or factor must
be mutable in order for a person to compare it with other
covariation information. If a person is unable to mutate certain
characteristics, he will either not compare it with "covariation"
information or will find it very uninformative to do so." The
research on contrastive reasoning has shown, for instance, that
individuals find it difficult to mutate (negate as an influence)
gender and social group for stereotypical behaviors and the roles
of those groups.79 These characteristics thus heavily influence
contrastively selected causes and often distort causal
attributions.
75. Roese & Olson, supra note 28, at 26.
76. Id. at 42. Experiments have also shown that individuals may purposefully
manipulate counterfactuals to create an optimistic worldview, which "make[s]
themselves.., feel better." Neal J. Roese, The Functional Basis of Counterfactual
Thinking, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 805-06 (1994). The tendency to make
oneself "feel better" may motivate individuals to select positive or neutral causes of an
event rather than negative explanations-for example, individuals may be more prone to
finding that a rejected applicant from a historically prejudiced status group did not get
the job because of a status-neutral reason rather than the employer's conscious (or
unconscious) bias for the particular status group. Note further that people who tend to
believe that "the world is a just place" or that "people get what they deserve" will have
more difficulty imagining how things could have turned out differently, impeding
counterfactual mutation altogether. Margaret Kasimatis & Gary L. Wells, Individual
Differences in Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, supra note 28, at 81,
88 (concluding that believers in a just world should engage in less counterfactual thinking
than do nonbelievers).
77. See Ann L. McGill & Jill G. Klein, Counterfactual and Contrastive Reasoning in
Explanations for Performance: Implications for Gender Bias, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN,
supra note 28, at 333, 335 (finding that both counterfactual and contrastive reasoning are
necessary for a "complete assessment of causation").
78. See Sonya A. Grier & Ann L. McGill, How We Explain Depends on Whom We
Explain: The Impact of Social Category on the Selection of Causal Comparisons and
Causal Explanations, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 545, 561 (2000).
79. See McGill & Klein, supra note 77, at 347-48; see also Grier & McGill, supra
note 78, at 562-63 (suggesting that stereotype-inconsistent behavior is more often
attributed to external causes, such as luck, or internal unstable causes, such as effort,
than stereotype-consistent behavior).
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a. The Effect of Gender Roles. Researchers have found that
male gender is less mutable-that is, removable as an
influence-than female gender and therefore covariation
information across gender is manipulated differently." For
instance, studies have shown that men who fail at a task are
compared with men who succeed, but women who fail are
compared to both men and women who succeed.81 This finding
indicates that observers tend not to mutate male gender and thus
confine the contrastive search for cause strictly to other factors
that might explain negative outcomes associated with men
failing at certain tasks.
For example, research subjects in one study were unable to
mutate maleness when using comparative data, but they could
mutate femaleness.82 When experimenters asked subjects why a
particular man succeeded or failed at a task in a given scenario,
the subjects compared the man's actions predominantly to other
men.83 Because of that comparison, subjects tended to causally
attribute results of the man's actions to personal characteristics,
for example, "Johnny's skill caused his failure or success." 4
Conversely, subjects compared the acts of a particular woman to
both men and women to explain why the woman had failed.88
These across-gender comparisons led subjects to explain female
failure more frequently in gender terms, for example, "women are
not successful at these tasks."86
The inability of people to mutate male gender is the result of
a type of "model actor fallacy."87 That is, the discrepancy in
mutability between men and women is because men are
generally considered the default or model actor in circumstances
involving traditionally male roles and behavior.8 This tendency
80. McGill & Klein, supra note 77, at 346-47; see also McGill, supra note 40, at
704-05 (noting that "preference for different sorts of backgrounds lead to different causal
explanations for the failure of men and women"); Alice H. Eagly & Mary E. Kite, Are
Stereotypes of Nationalities Applied to Both Men and Women?, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 451, 461-62 (1987) (arguing that nationality-based stereotypes apply to a
nation's men because men are more often "observed engaging in the distinctive behaviors
of national groups" than women).





86. Id. at 333, 347.
87. The "model actor fallacy" is a term novel to this Article and is used to describe
the phenomena of gender, race, and other classes being assigning prototypical activities
and roles by outside observers.
88. Dale T. Miller et al., Gender Gaps: Who Needs to Be Explained?, 61 J.
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is most apparent when women participate in traditionally male
activities, for example, the workplace, sports, and games.89 Social
norms thus influence the tendency to use men as the prototypical
actor who serves as a comparison or reference point for all
genders, that is, to compare men to men and women to men as
well.90
b. The Effect of Social Group Stereotypes. Similarly, an
individual's social or status group is also resistant to mutation
when that person engages in an activity typical of a member of
the social group.9 On the other hand, social group is more readily
mutated when group members perform tasks atypical of their
social group.
For example, if a Hispanic person plays soccer-assuming
soccer is an activity perceived as typical of that social group-and
excels, there is a tendency to compare that person's performance
to the performance of other Hispanic soccer players. The causal
evaluator may not look to the performance of others in different
social groups if she concludes that any information concerning
players from other social groups would not be as valuable.9" On
the other hand, if an African-American is a chief executive officer
of a company and commits a business error-assuming that
being a CEO is considered atypical of African-Americans-
evaluators of this error are more likely to search for covariation
information by comparing errors made by a group thought to
be typical of that position-assume, for example, whites-to
explain the outcome.93 In other words, the heightened mutability
of social group for actors engaged in atypical behavior can
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5-12 (1991) (testing the conclusion that the default
gender for voters is viewed as male by demonstrating that people imagine a man when
they think of the typical voter).
89. In contrast, when men participated in activities historically occupied by women,
individuals would more frequently compare men to women. McGill, supra note 40, at 704
(noting an "increased tendency to compare the unsuccessful male with successful females
for the female-oriented tasks"). This is consistent with the elements of norm theory that
predict individuals will mutate the gender of those who occupy roles different from a
perceived expectation. Id.
90. McGill, supra note 40, at 704; Miller et al., supra note 88, at 11 ("[M]en will be
viewed as the prototypical members of those categories they statistically dominate as well
as those in which they and women are equally common.. ").
91. See Grier & McGill, supra note 78, at 559 (summarizing an experiment and
concluding that "within-group comparisons were rated as more informative for typical
actors and across-group comparisons rated more informative for atypical actors").
92. Id. at 556-57, 561-63.
93. Id. at 557 (finding that participants in one study "rated across-group
comparisons higher for actors engaged in events that were atypical for their social
category; i.e., White actors engaged in typically Black activities and Black actors engaged
in typically White activities").
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determinatively influence the process of choosing subjects or
events for comparison toward the conclusion that social group is
the causal explanation.94
This "model actor fallacy" also distorts the use of
comparative information for social groups. People tend to rely
solely on comparative information from the social group whom
they perceive as the norm actor. For example, if a blue person
engages in a typically purple person's activity, the blue person is
much more likely to be compared to other purple people in
divining causes for the blue person's behavior. But if a blue
person participates in a typically blue activity, the blue person is
likely to be compared only to other blue people. Thus, when blue
person X engages in a typical blue activity, others will ascribe
causality to X's individual traits for the outcome-for example,
"X has a particular skill or deficiency at this task." But when
blue person X is engaged in atypical blue behavior, others will
ascribe causality to the blue social group for the outcome---"blue
people are not particularly good at purple people tasks."'
C. Concurrent Use of Contrastive and Counterfactual Thinking:
A Complete, Unbiased Causal Picture
Given the external influences on causal thinking,
researchers caution that both contrastive and counterfactual
analysis need to be employed concurrently to achieve the most
complete and unbiased causal assessment." When a dual
analysis occurs, the biases specific to each method can be
94. See id. at 561 (finding in one study that "differential attention to group
characteristics can be stigmatizing for actors considered atypical by suggesting that their
behavior is the result of factors that are common to the group and not the result of
individual choice").
95. Use of comparative information in this manner can cause individuals to think,
"People like me are just not meant to participate in this activity," as opposed to, "I need to
refine some personal quality to succeed in this activity." See Grier & McGill, supra note
78, at 561 (stating that the "effect of typicality might explain why smoking among
minority consumers is often attributed to group-based factors... , whereas use of these
products by members of the majority population is attributed to individual factors");
Miller et al., supra note 88, at 11 (noting that when explaining gender differences in
voting, an atypical behavior for women, "there may be a preference for focusing on those
characteristics that are lacking in women but present in men over those characteristics
that are present in women but lacking in men").
96. See Hilton, supra note 49, at 73-74, 77 (explaining that the conversational
model examines causal explanations by evaluating a target case against an applicable
contrast case to cure any presupposed norms or gaps in the information researchers give
their subjects); McGill & Klein, supra note 77, at 335-36 (explaining that both
counterfactual and contrastive reasoning are necessary for complete causation
assessment and citing research suggesting that people imperfectly apply these covariants
in a variety of circumstances, leading to "incomplete use of covariant information").
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mitigated, and a more nuanced and accurate assessment of
causation may be attained.
As previously discussed, counterfactual inquiries are
susceptible to an individual's mistaken world knowledge,
personal biases, and motivation. Contrastive inquiries are
susceptible to people's stereotypes and their inability to mutate
social groups and gender categories. When counterfactual
reasoning is followed with contrastive analysis, the generation of
comparative information can dispel any mistaken worldviews,
knowledge, personal biases, and motivational influences that
infect the counterfactual inquiry.97 Similarly, when explanations
generated by contrastive reasoning are then followed with
counterfactual mutations of different factors-like gender or
social group-such an exercise can dispel any attribution errors
that may have been caused by the model actor fallacy in
contrastive reasoning."
Counterfactual inquiry specifically isolates and removes
certain factors to examine their role in the outcome, while
contrastive inquiry removes results and examines which factors
or influences are still present.99 Using both processes together,
researchers suggest, allows more factors to be examined in more
varied ways than either one can alone."0 Counterfactual and
contrastive analyses, limited by their own vulnerabilities to bias,
are thus strengthened when applied together, enabling a richer
and more accurate causal analysis.
III. CAUSATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Both counterfactual and contrastive reasoning lie at the
center of the causal inquiry in antidiscrimination law. Embedded
within the evidentiary framework of both intentional and
disparate impact discrimination cases is a counterfactual
exercise that allows the plaintiff to demonstrate, at least
initially, that her status characteristic influenced, or caused to
97. See Grier & McGill, supra note 78, at 561 (explaining that neglecting to use
individual characteristics but relying on those of a group leads to biased conclusions);
McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 903-04 (examining research suggesting that neglecting
to follow contrastive reasoning with counterfactual reasoning creates flawed explanations
for events); McGill & Klein, supra note 77, at 335-41, 347-51 (concluding that using both
counterfactual and contrastive reasoning will decrease bias associated with attributing a
poor work performance to gender).
98. See McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 903-04.
99. Refer to Part II.B supra.
100. See McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 904 (suggesting that combining
counterfactual with contrastive reasoning would cause individuals to create more
accurate explanations for events).
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occur, the decision, action, or outcome. Once the plaintiff crosses
this hurdle, the burden practically (and often legally) shifts to the
decisionmaker to offer a status-neutral explanation. By rooting
the plaintiffs prima facie case of status influence in a
counterfactual mutation, the Court has had to be open about its
normative assumption about how social status operates in society
and its assumptions about decisionmaking processes and
procedures in the various contexts in which discrimination tends
to occur."' Because some of these normative assumptions are
subject to contestation,"°2  contrastive reasoning plays an
important role in making sure that they are not automatically
determinative of the causal inquiry.
Contrastive reasoning thus plays a crucial role in generating
other, more neutral explanations for decisions or outcomes that
initially may seem to be influenced by the plaintiffs status.
Indeed, evidentiary structures in both intent and impact cases
allow, and sometimes mandate, comparisons between the
plaintiffs treatment (or impact on her) and others who are"similarly situated" as a way of generating alternative
explanations or affirming the inference garnered in the
counterfactual exercise. Because the quality of this contrastive
exercise depends largely on the selection of the comparator
individual or group, much of the dispute in these cases revolves
around this selection.
A. Counterfactual Inferences of Status Influence: Why
Deviations from Expected Procedures and Outcomes Matter
The Court has aided plaintiffs, in both intent and impact
cases, in proving a prima facie case of intentional discrimination
by using a counterfactual "simulation heuristic"' rooted in a
101. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (illustrating
the Court's consideration of assumptions based on that which "we know from our
experience" when evaluating a plaintiffs prima facie discrimination case).
102. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color
Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77,
102 (2000).
If one assumes that, absent discrimination, members of different racial
groups are relatively similar in their interests and abilities, then one would
expect to find a relatively similar distribution of different groups throughout
various fields of social endeavor; if, on the contrary, one assumes that there are
significant and lasting differences amongst such groups, then one would expect
to find an unequal distribution of the groups throughout the society.
Id.
103. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in
JUDGMENT UNDER CERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201, 201-03 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982) (describing a "simulation heuristic" as a mental operation that retrieves
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normative assumption about the historical and continuing
influence of status discrimination in our society. This heuristic
involves imagining what decisionmaking processes and outcomes
would look like in a nondiscriminatory world and deeming
deviations from those processes and outcomes to be indicative of
status influence. As such, deviations from expected
decisionmaking outcomes or procedures may be presumed to be a
telltale sign of discrimination, absent a status-neutral reason for
the outcomes or results. This heuristic has the effect of giving
determinative weight and import to various types of
circumstantial evidence that it ordinarily would not carry in the
absence of the counterfactual exercise.
1. Departures from Expected Outcomes. As the Court has
emphasized in its equal protection jurisprudence, the uneven or
disparate outcomes of a decision are ordinarily of no
constitutional or judicial concern."' However, in cases involving
disparate adverse impacts on certain "suspect" groups, the Court
has candidly acknowledged the close connection between these
impacts and intentional discrimination. 5 In equal protection
jurisprudence, evidence of stark status disparities provides, at
the least, an important starting point for ascertaining the
motivation of decisionmakers and, in some circumstances, might
alone be enough to infer intentional discrimination.'
In crediting disparate impact evidence as probative of
intentional discrimination, the Court engages in a form of
counterfactual reasoning in which it mutates the historical
influences of certain status characteristics to ask, in essence,
"Would this particular decision or outcome be suspect without
"instances" from the mind and constructs scenarios to analyze and judge real events).
104. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979).
Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the
law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class
described by the law. When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven
effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional
concern. The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law
reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.
Id. (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 272-73 (explaining that classifications like race and gender "supply a
reason to infer antipathy" in part because they "have traditionally been the touchstone for
pervasive and often subtle discrimination").
106. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977)
("Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than [status], emerges from
the effect of... state action. .. ."); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
(noting that discriminatory impact may "for all practical purposes demonstrate
unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult
to explain on nonracial grounds").
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the history and experience of discrimination against the
particular status group impacted?" In this sense, the Court's
approach to disparate impacts on historically discriminated-
against groups is the mirror of its "suspect classification,"
reflecting a general suspicion that disparate status outcomes are
motivated by prejudice or stereotypes toward certain groups.' 7 It
thus did not strain credulity in early race discrimination cases to
infer intentional discrimination from the complete exclusion of
African-Americans and other minorities from juries, voting
districts, and other social goods, given knowledge of the
prevalent racial attitudes at the time.' The history of
discrimination transmits a social background and normative
expectation that decisionmakers are prone to rely upon
impermissible status characteristics, allowing the Court to treat
status as a likely explanatory factor for a facially neutral decision
that results in disparate impacts. 0 9
The historical and social context of bias has continued to
give salience to discriminatory outcomes that disproportionately
exclude members of protected status groups, even as the
proximity to the worst period of this history decreases. For
example, in Rogers v. Lodge,"' the Court found crucial to the
challenge of an at-large voting system the fact that, despite its
large African-American population, the voters had never elected
107. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272-74 ("The cases of Washington v. Davis... and
Arlington Heights... recognize that when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a
group that has historically been the victim of discrimination, an unconstitutional purpose
may... be at work.").
108. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-10 (1880) (recognizing
that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to eliminate discriminatory behavior and is
violated when jury selection processes exclude people based on race or color).
109. See Selmi, supra note 3, at 296-97 (explaining that, for example, without the
historical background, there would have been no reason in Yick Wo v. Hopkins "to suspect
discrimination as the impetus for the city's change in law, as other race-neutral reasons
may have been equally or more plausible").
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275 ("If the
impact of th[e] statute could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself
would signal that the real classification made by the law was in fact not neutral.");
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (noting that the unexplained redrawing of
district lines in a way that excluded African-Americans rendered the"conclusion... irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical
demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored
voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing
municipal vote").
110. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
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an African-American candidate to the County Board."' In an
opinion written by Justice White, the Court found this evidence
highly probative of discrimination: "Because it is sensible to
expect that at least some blacks would have been elected in
Burke County, the fact that none have ever been elected is
important evidence of purposeful exclusion." "' This is especially
significant given the County's record of historical discrimination
as developed by the lower court and the likely impact of that
discrimination on the ability of African-Americans to participate
fully in the voting system." 3
Jury selection cases-spanning from Hernandez v. Texas"4 to
Purkett v. Elem"-provide the most prominent example of the
Court allowing a prima facie case of discrimination to be made by
showing a pattern of exclusion of a racial group (most typically
African-Americans) from the jury venire or jury panel."6 Where a
pattern of exclusion is established, the "result bespeaks
discrimination," because in large part of the history of exclusion
of African-Americans and other racial groups from jury service."'
Relying upon statistical "hypothesis testing"-type reasoning,18
111. Id. at 614-16, 622-27.
112. Id. at 623-24.
113. See id. at 623-26 (describing the district court's findings). The evidence included
disparities between the percentage of African-Americans in the voting population and
their percentages among candidates for office, infrequent appointments of African-
Americans to county boards and committees, historical discrimination in other areas of
life that affect voter registration among African-Americans, the presence of racial bloc
voting, the unresponsiveness and insensitivity of elected officials to the needs of the
African-American populace, and current socioeconomic conditions that created barriers to
their participation in the electoral system. Id.
114. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
115. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
116. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986) (holding that an inference of
discrimination can be based on a prima facie showing of a "'pattern' of strikes against
black jurors"); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 484-85, 491-97 (1977) (conferring
constitutional scrutiny on Texas's "key-man" system of grand jury selection based upon
evidence of near total exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury panels over a period of
time).
The Court has held that exclusion on the basis of gender may also constitute an equal
protection violation. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994); see also Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356-58 (1991) (holding that excluding bilinguals through
peremptory strikes constitutes prima facie evidence of discrimination).
117. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-95; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358 (finding that a prima
facie case of racial discrimination was satisfied by evidence that the prosecutor challenged
the only three prospective jurors with Hispanic surnames).
118. Hypothesis testing posits and then rejects a proposition (that the decisionmaker
did not use race as a criterion) in order to establish its opposite proposition (that the
decisionmaker did use race as a criterion) to draw the necessary causal inference from a
pattern of decisions. See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION § 4.14 (2002). An example of the use of this statistical technique to infer
discrimination is provided by Castaneda, wherein the Court rejected the "null hypothesis"
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the Court has "declined to attribute to chance" the
disproportionate absence of a historically excluded status group
from the jury venire or panel.119 This strategy is particularly
relevant to cases in which the decisionmaking process or
selection procedure vests significant discretion in the
decisionmaker because this discretion "permits 'those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." 12' Thus, trial
courts may infer that race was the motivating purpose,
regardless of whether the decisionmaker was conscious of his or
her motivation, where the attorney cannot explain
disproportionate exclusion of status members from the jury121 or
does not give a sufficient explanation. 122
The presumption that, absent explanation, disproportionate
exclusion or impacts are not a result of chance but instead reflect
the likely influence of protected status considerations also
predominates civil rights law, particularly in the employment
discrimination area. 23 In both disparate impact and disparate
that the decisionmaker selected potential grand jurors randomly by relying upon
statistical evidence indicating that the number of Mexican-Americans that were
summoned for grand jury service was less than the number that would have been
summoned if race were not a factor in the selection process. 430 U.S. at 495-96.
119. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
120. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). When discretion
is limited by legislative guidelines or other decisionmaking constraints, the Court has
been less willing to infer status as an explanation for racially (or gender) disproportionate
outcomes. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-92, 297-300, 302-08 (1987)
(rejecting any inference of racial bias based on a multivariate statistical analysis
demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia; noting
that "'while some jury discretion still exists [in the capital sentencing process], the
discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards'" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976))).
121. See, e.g., Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472, 485-88 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding the
process for selecting jury venire discriminatory where petitioner demonstrated that the
selection procedure employed resulted in a substantial underrepresentation of African-
Americans "over a significant period of time," that no efforts were made to identify
qualified African-Americans for jury service, that the jury selection procedure was subject
to abuse, and that the state produced no evidence to explain the disparities on race-
neutral grounds); United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 639-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding a
Batson equal protection violation where defendant's counsel used all its peremptory
challenges to strike potential African-American jurors and failed to offer a race-neutral
explanation).
122. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363 (explaining that once the prosecutor offers a
race-neutral explanation, the trial court can consider the disparate exclusion of members
of a certain race "as evidence that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for
racial discrimination").
123. The employment context, however, involves a notably more complicated
decisionmaking process. See generally Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood:
Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J.
139, 143 (describing the EEOC's eighty-percent rule, which finds disparate impact where
there is a significant difference in selection rates between groups, and members of the
protected class are selected at a rate of eighty percent or less than the rate of the highest
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treatment "pattern or practice" cases... (the latter being a form of
intentional discrimination), plaintiffs may raise the inference of
discrimination with evidence of status imbalances in the
employer's workforce, as compared to their representation in the
appropriate labor pool.125 Citing the jury selection cases, the
Court has held that "where gross statistical disparities can be
shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie
proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination."'26 The Court
treats this evidence as a "telltale" sign of both disparate impact
and intentional discrimination because "absent explanation, it is
ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices
will in time result in a work force more or less representative of
the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
community from which employees are hired."
127
The presumption of status influence in employment cases
makes sense only in the context of our collective history and
ongoing experience of status-based discrimination in employment
markets.' 8 Thus, where a pattern of decisionmaking outcomes is
available, the outcomes are compared to an alternative reality
that mutates-removes-the influence of historical and ongoing
discrimination. 21 In a world in which status was no longer an
influence on employment opportunities, there might exist
numerous reasons why an employer's workforce would not reflect
the racial-ethnic-gender-age composition of the relevant pool of
qualified workers. It is also true that in a world in which status
exerts a great deal of influence, there are still plenty of other
non-status-related reasons and influences that might explain
selection group).
124. E.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
125. See Meier et al., supra note 123 (noting that "statistical evidence of disparity in
hiring or promotion may provide evidence" in both disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases).
126. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); see also
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 ("Ve have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof,
where it reached proportions comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination in jury selection cases.").
127. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
128. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate
Impact: A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 353 (1996) ("The
stratification lens helps us to see that every disparate impact case depends on an adverse
impact that is created jointly by social factors and the employer's employment practice.").
129. In disparate impact cases, the presumption is that the employer's criteria or
practices have interacted with social or historical conditions to exclude the population at
issue. See id. at 353-54 (explaining that the disparate impact model is "blindered" to
social and historical causes external to the employer that contribute to the impact;
instead, the model assumes the interaction between the employment criterion and
external social conditions in producing the disparate impact).
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deviation from expected proportional representation in the
workplace. 3 ° The Court recognizes this, in part, by allowing any
explanations to be put forth and examined by the
decisionmaker."l However, by placing the burden of proof on the
decisionmaker, the Court implicitly credits the fact that race and
other social statuses continue to shape decisions and influence
decisionmakers in ways that are often hard to detect.
2. Departures from Expected Processes and Criteria.
Intentional discrimination is often inferred through a close
assessment of the "totality" of circumstances, including evidence
of departures from expected procedural and substantive rules
and criteria in the decisionmaking process.'32 For instance, the
widely relied upon Arlington Heights factors are rooted in a
counterfactual reasoning process that again mutates the effect of
status influence on expected procedures and outcomes of
legislative decisionmaking processes in the absence of that
influence.'33  Absent a history of status discrimination,
substantive and procedural departures or irregularities in the
decisionmaking process might be indicative of a number of status
neutral influences on the process. However, the Court allows the
inference of discrimination, despite other potential explanations,
because status offers the strongest explanation for deviations
from normally relied upon decisionmaking procedures in light of
our collective historical and social experiences. "For example,
when legislatures deviate from customary practices where race
may be a factor, and no reasonable explanation for the departure
is forthcoming, the legislature's action is understood against the
historical fact that legislatures have often made distinctions
based on race in order to disadvantage minority groups." "
130. See, e.g., id. at 353 (suggesting that a discrepancy in the proportion of black
versus white employees with high school diplomas may be attributed to a difference in
"the quality of teachers in elementary or secondary school, in the financial resources of
the schools attended, in the resources of parents, and in a multitude of other factors").
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-67 (1977) (stating that the search for discriminatory purpose "demands a sensitive
inquiry into [all available] circumstantial and direct evidence"); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 241-43 (1976) (noting that intent can be "inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts").
133. The Arlington Heights Court indicated that the indicia of status influence may
be found in a combination of expected outcomes, procedures, and substantive factors,
along with the historical background of the decision (including previous decisions by the
decisionmaker), the sequence of events leading up to the decision, and presumably any
other factor that may shed light on the decisionmaker's motivations. Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 267-68.
134. Selmi, supra note 3, at 304-05. Selmi further explains,
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Similarly, departures from substantive factors have led the
Court to invalidate as discriminatory redistricting legislation
designed to increase voting opportunities for certain racial
groups."5 The Court has made clear that although legislatures
are always conscious of race while (re)drawing voting lines,
status (racial) considerations may not "predominate" the
redistricting process.' The plaintiffs burden to demonstrate race
as the predominant motive can be accomplished through the
circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics
and, in line with the Arlington Heights totality assessment, by
demonstrating that the legislature departed from substantive
factors or criteria normally relied upon when redrawing voting
lines.' For example, a discriminatory purpose can be
demonstrated by showing that the legislature substantially
neglected or ignored traditional districting criteria such as"compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or
communities."'38 Assessing the amount of deviation from these
factors allows the Court to engage in a task known for its
interpretive complexity: parsing out legitimate (political) and
illegitimate (race) influences on the legislature.9
Other than our history of racial discrimination, there is no reason that
deviations from legislative procedures would be relevant to proving intentional
racial discrimination.... [Aibsent a history of discrimination, such departures
might have been indicative of a propensity to vote against zoning requirements
for any number of reasons, including a race-neutral preference for preserving the
status quo. But race, we know, is different, and so, at least in Arlington Heights,
the Court suggested that certain inferences could be drawn based on our
knowledge and expectations about the operation of legislatures-inferences that
would not be plausible absent that historical background.
Id. at 305.
135. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-28 (1995) (striking down a
Georgia congressional redistricting plan that diluted the minority vote).
136. Id. at 915-16 (commenting that redistricting involves a "complex interplay of
forces" about which the courts must be sensitive). The Court, invoking the discriminatory
purpose rule, sets about a search to determine whether "race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district." Id. at 916.
137. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957-58, 962 (1996) (same); cf. Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (concluding that the legislature's motivation in
redrawing the boundaries as it had was predominantly political, not racial); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901-03, 905 (1996) (providing an example of a court's invalidation of
a voting district).
138. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. But see Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict
Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1569, 1584 (2002) (noting that "three factors the Court inexplicably left off its list of
traditional districting principles-compliance with one person, one vote; partisan
advantage; and protection of incumbents-are always going to be as important").
139. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16 (noting that the legislature's redistricting
"calculus" involves a "complex interplay of forces"); see also id. at 920 (noting that "a State
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By identifying expected salient factors in the redistricting
process and then comparing those to actual outcomes-such as
the highly irregular or unusual shape of a voting district-the
Court has again set up an evidentiary framework for rooting out
status influence based on violations of the procedures and
outcomes one would expect in a process not influenced by status
considerations. 40 Thus, where the legislature has departed from
these factors, the Court treats this departure as a form of
intentional discrimination on the basis of race and hence a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' Once predominant
racial motivation is demonstrated, the Court subjects the
is free to recognize communities that have a particular racial makeup, provided its action
is directed toward some common thread of relevant interests"); Bush, 517 U.S. at 964
(noting that "appellants point to evidence that in many cases, race correlates strongly
with manifestations of community of interest. .. and with the political data that are vital
to incumbency protection efforts, raising the possibility that correlations between racial
demographics and district lines may be explicable in terms of nonracial motivations"); id.
at 1060 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "in the political environment in which race
can affect election results, many of these traditional districting principles cannot be
applied without taking race into account and are thus, as a practical matter, inseparable
from the supposedly illegitimate racial considerations").
140. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 913 (viewing the shape of the district as "persuasive
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles,
was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines"); see
also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (finding that based on the unusual
shape of the district, the conclusion is "irresistible" that the redistricting was intended to
"fenc[e] Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal
vote").
141. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 903-05, 917, 922 (finding that the proposed
redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by drawing into the district areas
containing almost eighty percent of the district's black population, diluting the black vote,
and thus supporting the conclusion that race was a motivating factor). The discriminatory
purpose in these cases is not of the Feeney variety-that is, where the legislature has"selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Notwithstanding the Court's reliance on Feeney, there is no
claim by the plaintiffs in these cases that the state legislatures were motivated by ill will,
animus, or prejudice toward whites or any other racial or ethnic group or that the
legislation had any negative effect on plaintiffs' right to vote or participate in the political
process. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, 918-19 (citing Feeney and providing an example of
political redistricting with a discriminatory motive that did not involve racial animus or a
desire to prevent minorities from exercising their voting rights). Instead, plaintiffs have
claimed that they were "discriminated" against by the fact that legislatures were
motivated by race at all in redrawing district lines-that redistricting legislation that
increased opportunities for African-Americans "violated their constitutional right to
participate in a 'colorblind' electoral process." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993);
see also Bush, 517 U.S. at 1012 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'motive' with which we
are concerned is not per se impermissible. [JFor that reason, this litigation is very
different from... Arlington Heights .... in which the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant's action was motivated by an intent to harm individuals because of their status
as members of a particular group."). It is poignant to note that in these cases, as Justice
O'Connor noted in Shaw, some of the plaintiffs do not identify themselves as a racial
group-for example, "did not even claim to be white." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
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legislation to strict scrutiny, 142  in effect merging the
discriminatory purpose rule and the suspect classification
doctrine in a way that is consistent with the prevailing"colorblindness" norm in the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence.4 1
A similar counterfactual exercise is at work in individual
disparate treatment cases under employment discrimination law. A
plaintiff in an individual disparate treatment case can establish a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination where it is established
that she is a member of a protected status group (for example, race),
that she was qualified for the job, and that she did not get the job
while someone else did.14 This prima facie case in effect eliminates
the most common or expected criteria for hiring or firing a person-
for example, that the person was unqualified or that the position
142. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653 (justifying the application of strict scrutiny because,
without it, "a court cannot determine whether or not the discrimination truly is 'benign'").
As such, the legislation can only be saved by demonstrating a compelling state interest to
justify reliance on racial considerations and narrowly tailored means to achieve the racial
purpose. Id. at 658. The invocation of the strict scrutiny standard is a notable departure
from the Court's willingness to invalidate decisions motivated by a discriminatory
purpose, but may simply be an acknowledgement that racially motivated actions that
assist historically subordinated racial groups, as long as they are not the predominant
motivation of the decisionmakers, can sometimes be constitutionally permissible, whereas
those that have an "adverse effect" on such groups can never be. See Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 336-38, 341 (2003) (upholding the explicit use of race in a law school's
admissions process where it was only one factor among others in considering potential
students and furthered the compelling interest of racial diversity). But see Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003) (finding that race played too large a role in the
university admissions process); United States v. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d 1293, 1295-96,
1298-99 (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a defendant's counsel's use of race to strike six white
jurors as means of achieving a more diverse jury; the court held that such race-based
treatment is subject to strict scrutiny and found there was no compelling justification
because counsel did not make a Sixth Amendment claim that the jury was not
representative of a fair cross-section of the community).
143. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race".
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 615, 672-73 (discussing the automatic application of strict scrutiny whenever
race is shown to be the "predominant factor" in the creation of new voting districts).
144. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Tex. Dep't
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & n.6 (1981) (relying on McDonnell
Douglas and describing the plaintiffs prima facie case as a showing of circumstantial
evidence that would permit the inference of unlawful discrimination behind the
employment decision). Although these are Title VII (of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) cases,
this structure serves as the evidentiary framework under a number of civil rights
statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA). See DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir.
1995) (discussing how courts have extended the McDonnell Douglas framework from Title
VII cases to cases under the ADEA and the ADA). It also serves as an evidentiary
framework for nonemployment intentional discrimination cases brought under other civil
rights statutes. See, e.g., Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 137-38, 146 (2d
Cir. 1999) (using the Title VII framework on an intentional discrimination case brought
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983).
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was no longer available.'45 Once the plaintiff has established the
requisite elements, the Court treats an employer's refusal to hire (or
the firing of) the plaintiff as a violation of an expectation that
employers will hire (or retain) otherwise qualified and available
employees.'46 Clearly, there are many instances in which this
assumption is not true. As such, once the plaintiff satisfies the
prima facie case, the burden of explanation shifts to the employer to
produce a status-neutral reason for its decision. " 7
However, when an employer cannot convincingly explain its
decision-either because it has no admissible evidence of its reasons
or because the plaintiff has successfully discredited those reasons-
a deviation from "rational" business practices will support the
inference of status influence garnered in the prima facie case." ' The
normative assumption is that in the absence of invidious influences,
employers should be able to explain their personnel decisions"rationally."" 9 As such, "when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we
generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on
an impermissible consideration such as race." 5'
B. Explaining by Contrasting: Comparing the Treatment and
Outcomes of Different Individuals and Groups
A plaintiff reaps the inference of status influence or
"discrimination" from evidence given particular weight by a
counterfactual simulation heuristic that compels the defendant
145. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 ("The prima facie case serves an important
function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for
the plaintiffs rejection.").
146. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807 (holding that the plaintiffs
establishment of a prima facie case shifted the burden of production to the defendant to
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision).
147. Id. at 802.
148. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (allowing the
factfinder to infer discrimination when it disbelieves the employer's reasons for the
challenged decision); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147
(2000) (reconfirming that "in appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose").
149. As the court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978), "[W~e know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in
a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting."
150. Id. at 577; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ("[O]nce the employer's justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation,




to come forth with an alternative explanation. In both intent and
impact cases, defendants often rely upon contrastive reasoning to
generate and prove status-neutral explanations, and courts often
rely on that same reasoning to attribute the decision to the
proffered status-dependent reason versus the status-neutral one.
This comparative exercise has become indispensable to proving,
and disproving, status-based discrimination.
Recall that contrastive reasoning is a comparative exercise
designed to identify and then compare the targeted or challenged
event with instances in which the event did not occur to explore
possible explanations for the difference."' In antidiscrimination
law, defendants (and often plaintiffs) engage in this exercise to
identify instances in which the decision or outcome was different
and compare those to the challenged decision or outcome. Often
this comparison involves looking to "similarly situated"
individuals or populations, decisions, or other actions to identify
distinctive factors that account for their differential treatment or
impact. This identification might be based on actual knowledge
about the differences between the contrasted individuals or
events or on the comparators' own experience or worldview about
general distinctions between them. In other cases, statistical
data or the comparisons themselves become useful in identifying
particular distinctions or similarities between populations or
groups who are treated or impacted differently."'
1. "Similarly Situated" Analysis in Individual Decision
Cases. Comparative evidence is crucial to the defendant's ability
to explain the differential treatment of members of different
status groups by demonstrating that they are dissimilarly
situated from one another vis-A-vis a status-neutral factor. It is
also true that prosecutors and plaintiffs can employ the same
comparative exercise to call into question a decisionmaker's
status-neutral reason for discrimination by demonstrating that
she is similarly situated in all relevant respects to members of
another status group, except for the fact that the status group
was treated or affected more favorably."'
151. McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 897.
152. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 269-71 (1979) (discussing the
percentages of male and female veterans and the gender breakdown of civil service hirees
in analyzing whether a veterans' hiring preference for government positions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment).
153. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1712 (2002).
The intellectual exercise of finding the employees to be 'similarly situated' is
another way of eliminating the nondiscriminatory reasons: if the employees are
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In equal protection cases, for instance, courts often ask
whether members of a particular status group, such as men and
women, are similarly situated vis-A-vis a public benefit or
burden, such as jury selection or service,"4 veteran status,55
selective prosecution,'56 or public services or facilities,"7 taking
into account any relevant differences or factors that would
distinguish them."' For example, in Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney,"' the plaintiff brought a gender-based equal protection
challenge to a Massachusetts veterans' "absolute lifetime"
preference statute that "operate[d] overwhelmingly to the
advantage of males" because the majority of veterans are male. 6 °
The female challenger was a nonveteran who ranked second and
third on two different civil exams but was continuously passed
over for civil service positions in favor of male veterans. 6' She
alleged that the veteran's preference barred her from getting on
certified eligible lists, despite her test scores, on the basis of her
not similarly situated, then there is a nondiscriminatory reason for treating
them differently, but if they are similarly situated, then there can be no such
nondiscriminatory reason.
Id.
154. See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1992).
155. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
156. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (requiring that a
challenger claiming selective prosecution produce credible evidence that "similarly
situated" defendants of other status groups such as race could have been prosecuted but
were not).
157. See Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1261 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (analyzing
whether plaintiffs, who were female prisoners, were similarly situated with male
prisoners and addressing the claim of unequal access to institutional services).
158. See, e.g., Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 648-49 (8th Cir. 1996). In Keevan, a
class of female prisoners brought an equal protection challenge alleging that women
prisoners were provided with inferior postsecondary educational and employment
opportunities compared to male prisoners. Id. at 645. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim, in large part because male and female prisoners were not "similarly situated" for a
variety of reasons, including length of incarcerations, the size or their respective prison
populations, and the availability of male inmates for certain types of jobs. Id. at 647-49.
The court reasoned that "no two prisons are the same" and that comparing female and
male prison programs "is like the proverbial comparison of apples to oranges." Id. at 651
(quoting Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Pargo, 894 F.
Supp. at 1259-62, 1291 (holding that female and male prisoners were not similarly
situated according to such factors as population, average security level, types of crime,
and average length of incarceration; thus, the claim that female prisoners had inferior
access to services than male prisoners was rationally explained by the "different
institutional needs" of each).
159. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
160. Id. at 259, 261. The statute required that veterans and family members of
veterans be ranked above all other candidates on civil service exams, in order of their
respective scores. Id. at 263. Over ninety-eight percent of Massachusetts veterans were
male; thus the provision effectively limited the availability of civil service jobs for women.
Id. at 270-71.
161. Id. at 264.
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gender.' 2 In answering the central question-"whether this
veteran preference excludes significant numbers of women from
preferred state jobs because they are women or because they are
nonveterans"16'-the Court engaged in a contrastive exercise to
determine if men and women were similarly situated vis-a-vis
veteran status. Comparing the number of men who were affected
by the preference with the number of affected women, the Court
reasoned that men and women were similarly situated vis-A-vis
the disadvantage of being a nonveteran, and thus gender could
not have been the motivating influence behind the preference
given to veterans versus nonveterans:
Although few women benefit from the preference, the
nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the
contrary, significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and
all nonveterans-men and women-are placed at a
disadvantage. Too many men are affected by [the statute] to
permit the inference that the statute is but a pretext for
preferring men over women."'
162. See id. at 264 (noting that "because of the veteran's preference, she was ranked
sixth behind five male veterans on the Dental Examiner list... [and] placed in a position
on [another] list behind twelve male veterans, eleven of whom had lower scores").
163. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 275. The Court also asked the discrimination question in a different way
by considering whether a "discriminatory purpose" shaped the legislation. Id. at 276. The
Court agreed with the plaintiff that the legislature indisputably had acted intentionally to
advantage veterans and thus must have been aware that veterans' advantage would
disadvantage nonveterans, who are disproportionately women. See id. at 278 (describing
the legislation as "intentional" and commenting that "it cannot seriously be argued that
the Legislature of Massachusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are men").
However, the Court did not agree that by favoring veterans the state had "intentionally
incorporated into its public employment policies the panoply of sex-based and assertedly
discriminatory federal laws that have prevented all but a handful of women from
becoming veterans." Id. at 276. Thus, it concluded,
The District Court's conclusion that the absolute veterans' preference was not
originally enacted or subsequently reaffirmed for the purpose of giving an
advantage to males as such necessarily compels the conclusion that the State
intended nothing more than to prefer "veterans." Given this finding, simple logic
suggests that an intent to exclude women from significant public jobs was not at
work in this law.
Id. at 277.
But this reasoning seems to be tied inextricably to the first inquiry regarding
whether the statute excludes women "because they are women or because they are
nonveterans." Id. at 275. The Court's answer to the first causal inquiry-that the statute
distinguishes between veterans and nonveterans, not men and women--compels the
second conclusion that the legislature did not act out of any "discriminatory purpose"
toward women. Id. at 275-77. Although the Feeney Court tried to separate the two
questions as analytically distinct, see id. at 274 ("When a statute gender-neutral on its
face is challenged on the ground that its effects upon women are disproportionately
adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus appropriate."), both concern the influence of gender
(beliefs, bias, et cetera) on the legislature's decision to prefer veterans over nonveterans in
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Comparative evidence in jury selection cases similarly can
assist the prosecutor in generating status-neutral reasons why
certain jurors were excluded, while others belonging to different
status groups were not. Prosecutors might point to individual,
neutral distinguishing factors, ranging from a stated belief that
the juror is not intelligent or interested enough to weigh the
evidence adequately 65 to a suspected inability of jurors to be
impartial because of their profession, life experience, or personal
affiliations. 66  When a defendant can point to actual
dissimilarities that are unrelated to status as a distinguishing
feature between disparately treated individuals or groups, courts
tend to accept the proffered reason on its face, though that
reason can be shown to be pretextual if a plaintiff can prove that
it was false or tainted by stereotypes about a group. 7 In
civil service jobs. See id. at 275-80 (analyzing whether the veterans' preference law was a
pretext for preferring men over women and whether it was a gender-based discriminatory
purpose that shaped the veterans' preference legislation).
In short, I agree with Justice Stevens's concurrence (in which he was joined by
Justice White), where he opined similarly that
I am not at all sure that there is any difference between the two questions posed
[by the majority]. If a classification is not overtly based on gender, I am inclined
to believe the question whether it is covertly gender based is the same as the
question whether its adverse effects reflect invidious gender-based
discrimination. However the question is phrased, for me the answer is largely
provided by the fact that the number of males disadvantaged by Massachusetts'
veterans' preference (1,867,000) is sufficiently large-and sufficiently close to the
number of disadvantaged females (2,954,000)-to refute the claim that the rule
was intended to benefit males as a class over females as a class.
Id. at 281. Indeed, one need only look to the Court's racial redistricting cases to see how
these two inquiries are merged. Refer to notes 135-43 supra and accompanying text
(stating that "(racial) considerations may not 'predominate' the redistricting process," but
that "once predominate racial motivation is demonstrated, the Court subjects the
[redistricting] legislation to strict scrutiny, in effect merging that discriminatory purpose
rule and the suspect classification doctrine in a way that is consistent with the prevailing
'colorblindness' norm in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence").
165. See United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that
such explanation, although not "thorough or deep," was not "arbitrary or irrational" and
thus there was no clear error on the part of the district court in accepting this
explanation).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 634-35 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding
the prosecutor's explanation for striking the only juror with a Hispanic surname in a drug
conspiracy prosecution based on the explanation that because the juror worked at the
housing authority, she may have had the experience of "seeing drugs" in inner city
apartments operated by the housing authority and this might influence her impartiality).
167. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (holding that the proffered reason
need not be "persuasive, or even plausible" as long as it is facially valid, but also noting
that "implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be
pretexts for purposeful discrimination"); see also Luckett v. Kemna, 203 F.3d 1052, 1054-
55 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that though the prosecutor first explained that strikes of
African-Americans were based on answers to death penalty questions, which the
defendant disputed with pretext evidence that a white juror was also weak on death
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Hernandez v. New York,168 for example, a prosecutor was accused
of striking potential Latino jurors because of their ethnicity.169
The prosecutor's explanation was that the excluded jurors
differed from the others because of their conduct and responses
during voir dire, which indicated that "they might have difficulty
in accepting the [official] translator's rendition of Spanish-
language testimony" during the trial. "' The Court engaged in a
simple comparative exercise to conclude that the prosecutor's
explanation was facially race neutral-that it "rested neither on
the intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on
stereotypical assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals."' 1 The
Court questioned whether both Latinos and non-Latinos would
be similarly situated vis-A-vis the prosecutor's articulated basis
for excluding jurors and concluded that they were:
The prosecutor's articulated basis for these challenges
divided potential jurors into two classes: those whose
conduct during voir dire would persuade him they might
have difficulty in accepting the translator's rendition of
Spanish-language testimony and those potential jurors who
gave no such reason for doubt. Each category would include
both Latinos and non-Latinos. While the prosecutor's
criterion might well result in the disproportionate removal
of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact
does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.7 2
The Hernandez Court did indicate, however, that the
disproportionate impact of the prosecutor's explanations on
Latinos could be considered by the trial judge "as evidence that
the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial
discrimination.'7 3 The fact of disparate impact (a type of
comparative evidence) can be quite useful in proving that the
prosecutor's asserted explanation for striking jurors in a
particular status group was pretextual, particularly when the
trial court considers the larger social meaning of the exclusion.17 1
penalty and not struck, a second explanation that the African-American juror was similar
in age to the defendant was a sufficient race-neutral reason).
168. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
169. Id. at 355.
170. Id. at 361.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 363.
174. As the Hernandez Court explained,
In the context of this trial, the prosecutor's frank admission that his ground
for excusing these jurors related to their ability to speak and understand Spanish
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Similarly, where the challenger can show that a white
comparator juror who was not excluded from the jury is similar
in all relevant respects to the challenged juror, the credibility of
the attorney's explanation is called into question.'75 This has the
effect of confirming the inference garnered from the
counterfactual exercise in the prima facie case that given the
inability of the attorney to explain persuasively the reasons
behind her decisions, it is more likely than not that the attorney
was influenced by status considerations.
Comparative evidence in employment discrimination cases is
crucial to identifying other possible bases for the challenged
employment decision and to confirming the inference of status
influence from the prima facie case. In response to a plaintiffs
prima facie showing, an employer may point to almost any factor
or variable that distinguishes the treatment of a plaintiff from
similarly situated employees in different status groups.176 For
raised a plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language might be a
pretext for what in fact were race-based peremptory challenges. This was not a case
where by some rare coincidence a juror happened to speak the same language as a
key witness, in a community where few others spoke that tongue. If it were, the
explanation that the juror could have undue influence on jury deliberations might be
accepted without concern that a racial generalization had come into play. But this
trial took place in a community with a substantial Latino population, and petitioner
and other interested parties were members of that ethnic group. It would be common
knowledge in the locality that a significant percentage of the Latino population
speaks fluent Spanish, and that many consider it their preferred language, the one
chosen for personal communication, the one selected for speaking with the most
precision and power, the one used to define the self.
Id. at 363-64.
175. See, e.g., McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220-23 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
the prosecutor's explanations for the exclusion of two black jurors were pretextual based on
comparison with similarly situated white jurors who were not excluded); United States v.
Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding the defense counsel's reasons for striking
blacks from the jury to be pretextual where similarly situated white jurors were not also
excluded).
176. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts' Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in
Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831, 859 (2002) (arguing that "distinctions
can always be created between employees" so that they are not similarly situated, and '[aill
employees can be characterized as unique in some ways ... depending on the attributes on
which one focuses, and the degree of specificity with which one considers that employee's
qualifications, skills, tasks and level of performance'" (alteration in original) (quoting Marzano
v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 511 (3d Cir. 1996))). Courts often also require plaintiffs, as
part of their prima facie case, to demonstrate that the employer treated similarly situated
individuals differently. See, e.g., Patton v. Indianapolis Sch. Bd., 276 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir.
2002); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); Rutherford v. Harris
County, 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 233 (4th
Cir. 1999); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). This requirement, however,
appears to contradict the evidentiary framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, arguably
frustrating the purposes of the prima facie case set up by the Court. See Lidge, supra, at 855-
56 (arguing that the similarly situated requirement frustrates the prima facie case's main
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example, in cases challenging firing decisions, among the most
common distinguishing factors invoked to distinguish comparator
employees are that they have different supervisors, different
responsibilities and job titles, and different conduct.17 As in jury
selection cases, courts tend to accept explanations for the
decision based upon these comparisons regardless of whether the
explanation actually motivated the employer's decision. "8
Because the defendant's burden in individual disparate
treatment cases is one of production and not persuasion, the
defendant needs only to introduce evidence of any credible,
status-neutral explanation or factor that distinguishes the two
employees to rebut the inference in the prima facie case.
Plaintiffs may, in turn, attempt to show pretext by
establishing that they are similarly situated to favored
employees or applicants in all relevant ways, calling into
question both the credibility of defendant's explanation and its
causal connection to the actual decision. In this way, plaintiffs
may employ contrastive analysis as a means of confirming
the inference of status influence established by the
counterfactual heuristic in the prima facie case.'8 ° In St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks,' the plaintiff successfully proved that
purpose, which is "to eliminate the most common reasons for the [decision] so that, at the
pretext stage, the focus will be placed on the real reason for the employment action... by
making courts exert a lot of effort focusing on fine-and sometimes irrelevant-distinctions
between employees").
177. See iUdge, supra note 176, at 863-80 (reviewing the case law).
178. Id. at 878 (arguing that the court in Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc.,
220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000), although correctly determining that "an employer is entitled to
make a business judgment that [a black employee's act of] bumping a co-employee [with his
chest] is worse conduct than [a white employee's act ofl threatening an individual with a
crowbar," erred by simply taking "the employer's word that this was its actual motive").
Furthermore, Professor Lidge argues that "the Fourth and Sixth Circuits [have] made similar
errors."Id. at 878 n.244.
179. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (concluding that
"the burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence ... [of] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and that
the defendant is not required to "persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons"); Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123-24 (stating that after the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, "the burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action").
180. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (noting that
pretext can be shown by demonstrating that "the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence"); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 256 (noting that in an individual disparate treatment
employment discrimination case, once the employer introduces its status-neutral reason, the
plaintiff has an opportunity to show "pretext"-to demonstrate that the asserted reasons given
by the defendant are not its true reasons). If plaintiff is successful in doing so, "the trier of fact
can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
181. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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the reasons the employer gave for his demotion and
discharge-"the severity and the accumulation of rules
violations"-were false. 8 ' The plaintiff, Hicks, was able to
demonstrate "that [he] was the only supervisor disciplined for
violations committed by his subordinates" and that "similar
and even more serious violations committed by [his white] co-
workers were either disregarded or treated more leniently."18 3
Under current case law, once the employer's justification is
proven to be unworthy of credence, this allows, but does not
compel, the conclusion that status played a role in the
decision. 184
2. Statistical Comparisons in Pattern and Practice and
Disparate Impact Cases. Evidence establishing (either
intentional or impact) discrimination against a class of group
members often turns on a statistical disparity showing competing
explanations for those disparities. As discussed above, inferring
status influence from statistical disparities rests on a
counterfactual mutation that treats deviations from roughly
equal outcomes as evidence of discrimination.' However, the
statistical disparity analysis is, in and of itself, a form of
contrastive analysis. It allows a class of plaintiffs to isolate other,
more common explanations for adversely differential treatments
or impacts by selecting an appropriate comparison pool
consisting of individuals who possess similar characteristics
(except their status) as those in the disadvantaged status group.
Thus, for example, the Court has repeatedly held in the
employment context that the proper comparison pool of persons
for measuring adverse differential treatment or impacts is
"between the racial composition of [the defendant's workforce]
and the racial composition of the qualified.., population in the
relevant labor market."'86 A careful choice of the comparator
population serves to eliminate the most common explanations-
the group's qualifications or availability-for the differential
182. Id. at 507-08.
183. Id. at 508.
184. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10); Teneyck v.
Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("If the factfinder rejects the
defendant's proffered explanation, this permits-but does not compel-the factfinder 'to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.'" (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511)).
185. Refer to Part III.A.1 supra.
186. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (second
alteration in original) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977)
(applying this comparison to pattern and practice discriminatory treatment cases)).
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treatment or impact, and also eliminates random chance as an
explanation for the status disparity.
For example, in Wards Cove, a class of Filipino and Alaskan
native plaintiffs challenged the racially stratified workforce of an
employer that operated a salmon cannery.8 ' The "cannery" jobs,
which were unskilled positions, were filled predominantly with
nonwhite workers hired through a local union and a local
village.' The higher paid "noncannery" positions, a mix of skilled
and nonskilled jobs, were filled with predominantly white
workers typically hired through the defendants' corporate
offices."5 9 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's hiring
methods and criteria--"nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of
objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels," failure to
promote from within, failure to post noncannery openings, an
English language requirement, and word of mouth recruitment-
were responsible for the racial stratification of the defendant's
workforce.9 °
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected as proof of a racially
discriminatory impact a comparison showing a disparity between
the racial composition of cannery jobs (all nonwhite) and
noncannery jobs (virtually all white)."' Because these workers
were not similarly situated in terms of their qualifications and
skills, the comparison rendered inapplicable the presumption
that absent discrimination, the racial makeup of those respective
jobs would mirror each other.9 In other words, as the Court
reasoned, "if the absence of minorities holding such skilled
187. See id. at 647-48 (describing the segregated work environment and race-based
hiring procedures at the defendant canneries).
188. Id. at 647.
189. Id. Defendant's workplace was racially stratified in other ways as well. Workers
in the cannery and noncannery jobs worked and lived separately, "bear[ing] an unsettling
resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy." Id. at 649 n.4; id. at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
190. Id. at 647-48 (describing the hiring methods and criteria that plaintiff argued
led to the racial stratification of defendant's workforce). The plaintiff must isolate with
particularity each employment practice or criteria that operates to exclude a
disproportionate number of protected status-group members in the relevant population or
labor pool. See id. at 657 (explaining that the plaintiff must show that the disparate
impact was caused by specific, identifiable employment practices); see also Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2000) (noting an exception "that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking
process may be analyzed as one employment practice").
191. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55 (explaining the Court's reasoning).
192. See id. at 651-52 (describing a comparison of the number of nonwhites holding
"skilled" noncannery positions to the number of nonwhites holding cannery positions as
"nonsensical" because the groups are not similarly situated).
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[noncannery] positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite
applicants... [the employers'] selection methods or employment
practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on
nonwhites."'93 Instead, the "'proper comparison [should have
been] between the racial composition of [the noncannery workers]
and the racial composition of the qualified.., population in the
relevant labor market.""94 This comparison would potentially
eliminate the most common reason for not hiring plaintiffs'
status group in representative numbers-lack of qualifications-
as well as eliminate the defendant's decisionmaking process as
the cause of the adverse impact.
Just as plaintiffs can demonstrate the influence of status
through this type of comparison, so too can defendants use the
same comparison to generate an alternative, neutral explanation.
Assuming that plaintiffs are able to demonstrate a significant
disparity between the advantaged group and the disadvantaged
group, controlling for the most common status-neutral reasons
that would explain the disparity, it is incumbent on defendants
(as it is in individual discrimination cases) to illustrate why the
two contrasted groups are not "similarly situated" in any
meaningful way.9 ' As with challenges to individual
discrimination cases, the defendant will point to almost any
dissimilarity between the two groups to articulate a neutral
reason why the disparity is not causally related to a protected
status characteristic.
In Wards Cove, plaintiffs sought to control for differential
qualifications by pointing to a more exacting comparison between
the racial composition of the cannery workers (all of whom were
unskilled) and the racial composition of the unskilled noncannery
workers who earned significantly more than the (unskilled)
cannery workers.9 The assumption underlying this showing is
that both groups were similarly situated in terms of skill, but not
in terms of status, yet one group earned significantly more for
essentially the same work. The court of appeals found that this
comparison indeed made out a prima facie case of disparate
impact.9 7 Nevertheless, accepting that the two classes of workers
193. Id.
194. Id. at 650 (third alteration in original) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).
195. Refer to text accompanying notes 176-79 supra (suggesting that courts tend to
accept defendants' arguments distinguishing disparately treated individuals or groups).
196. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652 (citing statistics used by the plaintiffs to
support their disparate impact claim).
197. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 444-45 (9th Cir. 1987).
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were similarly situated in terms of their "fungible skills," the
Supreme Court rejected the comparison as "irrelevant" by
pointing to a status-neutral factor-presumed lack of interest-
that might explain the disparity.'98 The Court held that there was
no evidence that the nonwhite cannery workers applied for the
higher paid jobs or would have done so "even if none of the
arguably 'deterring' practices existed."'99 On the other hand,
there was also no evidence that they were uninterested.2 "'
There is a danger lurking in the pervasive use of the
similarly situated, comparative analysis in antidiscrimination
cases.20 1  The contrastive, similarly situated exercise in
antidiscrimination law can easily be equated with the more
evaluative causal inquiry that is central to the wrong of status-
based discrimination. Contrastive analysis can generate .crucial
information on possible explanations for differential treatment
and impacts by identifying similar or distinctive features of
comparable cases. However, it should not be mistaken for the
causal evaluation itself. As some courts have realized,
distinguishing factors can always be created between two
comparator individuals or outcomes.' As the next Part
illustrates, because the contrastive analytical exercise is so
vulnerable to cognitive biases, causal judgments heavily reliant
198. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54; see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1264, 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (concluding that the statistical analysis showing
a gender segregated workforce despite similar qualifications of women was "virtually
meaningless" because it was based on the faulty assumption that female sales applicants
were as "interested" as male applicants in commission sales jobs).
199. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54.
200. See id.
201. See Lidge, supra note 176, at 831-32 (describing some of the ways that courts
misuse the "similarly situated" concepts). Some courts rigidly apply the similarly situated
concept by requiring, for instance, that the plaintiff and the comparator be similar in all
respects regardless of the nexus between those similarities and the reasons for the
challenged decision. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 579-80, 583 (6th
Cir. 1992) (requiring an African-American female plaintiff who was fired for
insubordination by a five-member review board to find a comparator who engaged in the
exact same conduct, dealt with the same supervisor, and was subject to the same
standards notwithstanding the fact that the supervisor was not responsible for firing the
plaintiff, that the same employment manual governed all employees' behavior, and that
other employees were not fired for varying types of insubordination).
202. See, e.g., Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1996)
(rejecting a "similarly situated" requirement as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case and
reasoning that "all employees can be characterized as unique in some ways and as
sharing common ground with 'similarly situated employees' in some other ways,
depending on the attributes on which one focusses [sic], and the degree of specificity with
which one considers that employee's qualifications, skills, tasks and level of
performance"); see also Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d 889, 894-95 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
that the district court had defined the similarly situated employee showing so narrowly as
to make it "virtually impossible" for the plaintiff to point to a comparator).
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on this type of analysis can give rise to causal attribution
mistakes. These judgments tend not to be closely tied to the more
evaluative work involved in the causation inquiry that is so
critical to an assessment of whether prohibited discrimination
exists.
IV. CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION AND COGNITIVE BIAS
Violation of antidiscrimination norms is rooted in
differential treatment or impact because of an individual or
group's protected status. The causal inquiry is thus not an open-
ended, "truth-seeking" one. That is, it does not seek to explain
the entire universe of factors that could account for a particular
decision or occurrence.2 °3 Rather, it asks only whether a protected
status category like race or gender has necessarily or
determinatively influenced the challenged outcome or decision.
As such, the causal inquiry in antidiscrimination cases is
evaluative, not explanatory."4 This evaluative step is really the
normative work of antidiscrimination law because it inquires into
the social and psychological mechanisms of status
discrimination-including reliance on reasons (and reasoning)
that may reflect outmoded stereotypes, expectations, and beliefs
about different status groups.
The difference between evaluative and explanatory causal
heuristics turns importantly on the quality and type of
information that they generate. As social science research has
illustrated, the difference between counterfactual reasoning (an
evaluative exercise) and contrastive reasoning (an explanatory
exercise) is that the latter tends to focus on finding any sufficient
factor or characteristic that might explain disparate treatment or
outcomes, whereas the former tends to focus on the necessity of a
particular causal factor to the decision or outcome.0 5 Another
203. See Selmi, supra note 3, at 327 ("In conducting [the intent] inquiry, a court is
not concerned with what the real reason was in some absolute or abstract sense, but only
with whether discrimination can be established as the employer's motive consistent with
the applicable standard of proof .... "). Indeed, research indicates that "in devising a
causal explanation for an occurrence, people typically do not report the complete list of
factors they believe are related to an event." McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 898.
Instead, they select a subset of these factors that render the decision unusual or
unexpected. Id.
204. See McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 898-99 (finding that an explanation-
focused causal inquiry seeks to determine the various factors that provide an explanation
for an occurrence, whereas an evaluation-focused causal inquiry involves determining
whether a factor is among those that influenced an occurrence).
205. See id. at 897 (identifying the emphases of counterfactual and contrastive
reasoning). Thus, counterfactual reasoning elucidates factors or influences whose absence
would make the decision or outcome unlikely to occur. See id. at 898, 903-04 (describing a
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way of stating the difference is that evaluative causal
mechanisms such as counterfactuals focus on instances in which
the causal candidate is absent ('Would the employee have been
fired if she were not a woman?"), whereas explanatory causal
mechanisms consider instances in which the effect is absent
("What differentiates the employee who was fired from employees
who were not fired?")."6  Explanatory mechanisms, like
contrastive reasoning, are also particularly susceptible to
cognitive stereotypes because of the tendency to attribute
differences in events, outcomes, and behaviors to social group
membership; the immutability of statuses like race and gender
only accentuates this problem.!0 7 For this reason, researchers
suggest that explanations for differences in behavior and
outcomes involving social status characteristics like race and
gender should be subjected to closer evaluation in order to
uncover any cognitive biases that may be influencing causal
attributions. For example, social scientists suggest that
explanations generated by comparative or contrastive reasoning
should be followed up by a counterfactual inquiry, which would
more thoroughly evaluate the causal candidate(s) identified as an
explanation for the decision or outcome.0 8
study suggesting that flawed causal judgments result when "people do not follow up
contrastive thinking with counterfactual reasoning when asked to suggest a possible
explanation for an event").
206. Id. at 897.
207. See generally id. (detailing two studies suggesting that presenting questions
eliciting counterfactual reasoning as opposed to contrastive reasoning "may be most
effective in decreasing people's negative beliefs regarding the capabilities of women");
Grier & McGill, supra note 78, at 561-63 (explaining the results of a study finding that
individuals attribute stereotype-consistent behavior to internal stable causes (e.g., ability)
and stereotype-inconsistent behavior to either external causes (e.g., luck) or internal
unstable causes (e.g., effort)); see also Ann L. McGill, Relative Use of Necessity and
Sufficiency Information in Causal Judgments About Natural Categories, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 70, 80-81 (1998) (finding that participants in four studies
placed less emphasis on necessity information than sufficiency information when the
target factor or characteristic corresponded to a "natural" category-like race, age,
gender-rather than "artifactual" categories). Participants were less willing "to search for
alternative explanations when the target explanation was based on a natural kind
category in comparison with artificial or artifactual categories." Id. at 70. McGill
concluded that people tend to "judge explanations based on natural categories according
to lower standards of evaluations than those based on other explanations." Id. at 80.
208. See, e.g., McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 903-04 (explaining that study
participants who observed instances in which there were no successful females in a job,
but some prior successful and unsuccessful males, tended to identify gender as a
distinctive explanation for rates of success and to attribute the failure of a recent female
employee to her gender). Researchers suggest that such an explanation is flawed because
it ignores what would be found out through counterfactual reasoning-that is, if the
employee had not been a woman that she nevertheless might have failed. Id.
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Yet, as this Part will illustrate, this evaluative step is often
skirted or ignored in the evidentiary frameworks that determine
the influence of status on otherwise facially neutral decisions and
outcomes. For this reason, these frameworks are quite vulnerable
to attribution mistakes that result from the very same cognitive
biases that give rise to discrimination itself. This vulnerability is
most evident in the tendency to allow causal judgments to rest
uncritically on comparative (for example, similarly situated)
analysis alone. The exercise of selecting and then comparing
instances in which the decision or outcome was different to
generate explanations for those differences is subject to the type
of cognitive biases that, in particular, affect causal judgments
about the influences of statuses like gender and race." 9 The
potential for incomplete or, worse, biased causal judgments lurks
in the process of selection and comparison underlying contrastive
reasoning in both intent and impact cases.
A. "Dropping" Status as an Explanation
The evidentiary framework in individual disparate
treatment employment discrimination cases illustrates the
vulnerability of causal judgments when they become unhinged
from an evaluative heuristic. As shown above, the plaintiffs
prima facie case is often rooted in a counterfactual, evaluative
heuristic that infers the influence of status by eliminating the
most common status-neutral reasons for the decision and then
inferring that status influence where the defendant cannot
sufficiently explain the decision.21 Defendants often point to
distinguishing factors or explanations to explain why the plaintiff
was treated more adversely than others. Because employment
decisions are often the result of a complex configuration of
factors, it is not enough to simply identify the subset of factors
that can possibly explain the decision. The effect of the
defendant's proffered explanation should be to sharpen but not
conclude the causal inquiry by narrowing the universe of causal
candidates and allowing the factfinder to then evaluate each in
turn.' In other words, because the crucial inquiry is whether
209. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1204-07 (reviewing attribution theory and
explaining that cognitive biases may affect the interpretation of differences in "'similarly
situated' workers" because individuals tend to "attribute stereotype-consistent behaviors
to stable, stereotypic traits" and do not consider other "relevant information").
210. Refer to notes 144-46 supra and accompanying text.
211. See Selmi, supra note 3, at 326-28 ("By separating the world into
'discrimination' and 'nondiscrimination,' the Court's model resembles hypothesis testing,
a statistical procedure in which a researcher sets out to prove a proposition by attempting
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status played a role in the decision, a further evaluative step is
needed to determine the likelihood that status was such an
influence, notwithstanding the existence of other factors that
might also have influenced the decision or outcomes.212
However, the Supreme Court has severed this evaluative
causal inquiry from the evidentiary framework in disparate
treatment cases. For example, Hicks dilutes the evaluative
exercise required of the factfinder by reversing the inference of
status influence garnered in the prima facie case when an
explanation, even if proven false, is produced by the employer.213
Recall that the plaintiff in Hicks successfully proved that the
reasons the employer gave for his demotion and discharge-the
severity and accumulation of rules violations-were false.214
Having satisfied the prima facie case, the Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because the "defendants were in no better position than if they
had remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established
inference that they had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff
on the basis of his race."215 This was consistent with the original
framework set out in McDonnell Douglas, which made clear that
after the defendant proffered a believable status-neutral reason
for the action, the employment decision "must stand" unless the
plaintiff could prove that it was a "pretext."216 However, where
the plaintiff did prove that the employer's reasons were
to disprove it."); see also Schwartz, supra note 153, at 1710-11 ("The premise of [Title VIII
cases is that an employment decision is motivated either by discrimination or by
something else, but not by a combination of the two.").
212. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 acknowledges this by requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate only that status was "a" motivating factor in the employment decision. 42
U.S.C. 1981 § 2000e-2(m) (2000); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 142 (2000) ("When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment [under the ADEA],
'liability depends on whether the protected trait.., actually motivated the employer's
decision.' That is, the plaintiffs age must have 'actually played a role in [the employer's
decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.'" (third
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 610 (1993))).
213. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (reiterating strongly
that the plaintiff "at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion [in discrimination
cases]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. See id. at 508 (summarizing the district court's finding that "the reasons
petitioners gave were not the real reasons for [Hicks's] demotion and discharge"). The
plaintiff was able to demonstrate that he was the only supervisor disciplined for violations
committed by his subordinates and that similar and even more serious violations
committed by his coworkers were either disregarded or treated more leniently. Id.
215. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added). The District Court determined that Hicks's immediate supervisor manufactured
the final confrontation to provoke Hicks into threatening him. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508.
216. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
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pretextual, or false, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment based
217on the inference obtained in the prima facie case.
The holding of the Hicks Court, however, is contradictory to
its earlier statements that the plaintiffs burden of proving
intentional discrimination is fulfilled by satisfying the prima
facie case (with its presumption of status influence) and by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.218 After Hicks, the presumption of status influence,
"having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward
with some response, simply drops out of the picture" and is no
longer relevant. 19 The Hicks Court reasoned that the fact that
the proffered explanation is "unpersuasive, or even obviously
contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiffs
proffered reason of race is correct."22 °
The Court is probably correct in its assessment that just
because an employer has made a judgment that is "irrational,
suboptimal, or inconsistent with judgments made in similar
situations" does not necessarily mean the employer has relied
upon status considerations.221 On the other hand, there is
something inherently suspicious about an employer that needs to
produce a false reason for a plaintiffs treatment. As such, it
makes sense to preserve, as the Court does, the option of ruling
for the plaintiff even without the presumption of status
inference-that is, losing the presumption doesn't necessarily
mean losing the evaluative focus at the heart of the causal
inquiry. As the Court explains, the defendant's "production" of
any explanation (regardless of its persuasive effect) still allows
the trier of fact to proceed to the "ultimate question" of whether
the defendant has discriminated against the plaintiff because of
her status.222 Significantly, the Court permits the factfinder to
infer from the falsity of the defendant's proffered reasons that
the defendant more likely than not was influenced by the
217. See id. (holding that the district judge "must order a prompt and appropriate
remedy" if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual).
218. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 256 (1981) (stating
that the plaintiff "may succeed" in persuading the court that she has been a victim of
intentional discrimination "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence").
219. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 524.
221. Krieger, supra note 6, at 1181 (noting also that "pretext analysis permits this
inferential leap from an apparently irrational or inconsistent judgmental process to an
intentionally discriminatory one through the operation of a presumption of invidiousness"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
222. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
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plaintiffs status, without any additional proof on the plaintiffs
part.223
It is also true, however, that without the legal inference from
the prima facie case, the factfinder may also accept the
defendant's explanation without any further evaluation of
whether the status of the plaintiff nevertheless influenced the
defendant.224 Indeed, what is lost after Hicks is the force of the
normative work done in the prima facie case-not only the
assumption that an employer should be able to explain its
decisions rationally when it appears from circumstantial
evidence that status was a likely influence, but also the reality
that status continues to influence employment decisions and
practices.
One way of exploring whether a valuable aspect of the causal
analysis has been lost after Hicks is to ask, "Under what
circumstances would a factfinder conclude, even after the
defendant's own reasons for the challenged action have been
proven false, that status more likely than not influenced the
decision?" After the defendant has produced an explanation-
usually by pointing out that the plaintiff is dissimilarly situated
to others who were not hired or who were fired vis-A-vis some
distinguishing factor-the factfinder's causal compass depends
heavily on her own knowledge and assumptions about
discrimination and the status group at issue.225 That is, the
possibility of plaintiffs status is still ever present, but there is no
real compulsion, legal or otherwise, to evaluate critically how and
whether status considerations might have operated on the
decisionmaker or the decision here.
223. Id. The Court has since clarified, without overruling Hicks, that "the trier of fact
may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case 'and inferences
properly drawn therefrom.., on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is
pretextual.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). The evidence of the plaintiffs prima
facie case, combined with the fact the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence,
may permit the trier of fact to conclude that status played a determinative role in the
decision. See id. at 148 ('Thus, a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of
fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."). To be sure, however, the
plaintiff no longer has a strong presumption that she can carry into this pretextual
(causal) assessment from the prima facie case. See id. (cautioning that showing the
employer's justification for its action is false will not "always be adequate to sustain a
jury's finding of liability").
224. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11 (explaining that if the defendant meets its burden
of production, the prima facie presumption is no longer viable).
225. Refer to Part II.B supra (discussing the effects of bias and personal motivation
on counterfactual reasoning about causation).
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Recall that a large part of the way individuals reason about
causation is dependent upon what they think are "norm" or
"typical" occurrences. 26 Individuals often can identify causal
variables or explanations by determining whether the occurrence
in question is typical or expected under normal circumstances
(without the influence of the variable at issue).27 Whether the
challenged decision appears to be typical or expected in many
instances will depend on one's own knowledge base and
normative expectations, which in turn are influenced by personal
ideas-and often stereotypes-about the behavior and roles of
different status groups.2 2 8
For instance, someone who believes that discrimination is
largely a phenomenon of the past might be less likely to credit
plaintiffs status as a likely explanation, thereby stunting that
person's ability to assess accurately the probabilities that the
decision was made on account of such status.229 Likewise,
someone with greater knowledge of, or experience with,
discrimination will be more able to assess the influence of status
in the face of a defendant who has not produced a credible,
neutral explanation."' The same is true of biases.231 Someone who
believes that women or African-Americans are normally less
capable of performing in the particular position at issue will
easily, at any level of consciousness, be more inclined to imagine
other, neutral reasons why a defendant might have made a
particular decision.' Another person may tend to see status
226. Refer to notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text (examining Norm Theory).
227. Refer to note 37 supra and accompanying text (suggesting that individuals,
when attempting to explain an occurrence, compare it to what that individual believes to
be a normal occurrence).
228. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 338-39 (explaining how an individual relies on
stereotyped beliefs when interpreting others' behavior so that the behavior may be
perceived to support the individual's existing beliefs).
229. Krieger, supra note 6, at 1226.
Given that pretext theory applies only when relatively more salient direct
evidence of animus is lacking, discriminatory intent is not likely to be viewed as
a convincing explanation for what occurred. This leaves us with one
overwhelming influence on jury decision-making: jurors' preexisting biases
regarding the prevalence of conscious, intentional discrimination.
Id.
230. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Politics of Common Ground, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1306, 1313 (1998) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997))
(suggesting that "jurors of color may bring distinctive experiences into deliberations and
may actually prod an otherwise all-white jury into confronting commonly held
assumptions and approaching evidence from a different analytical position").
231. See id. at 1314 (citing research that shows people tend to "resort to categories or
stereotypes in attempting to understand and predict the behavior of others").
232. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 339.
In ambiguous social situations, it will always be easier to find evidence
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influence in places where it may not exist because of his own
biases in favor of generally disadvantaged groups, and so on.
The point is that the factfinder's ability and willingness to
evaluate whether the plaintiffs status motivated the defendant
is dependant upon the influence of various cognitive biases that
form the knowledge base used to make causal judgments.233
Moreover, the costs of attribution mistakes made by the
counterfactual heuristic employed are much higher at a later
stage than at the initial stage-for example, in the prima facie
case. Any causal mistakes made by the counterfactual simulation
heuristic at the initial stage-such as overestimating the
probability that status influenced the outcome--can be corrected
at a later stage-for instance, through the generation of more
information about the decisionmaking process and its outcomes.
In other words, the potential influence of various exogenous
factors on counterfactual causal mechanisms suggests a reason
for wanting to generate more information about the challenged
decisionmaking process and its outcomes before the final
attribution stage. Hence, it is fitting that contrastive reasoning is
invoked as a check on any mistakes made at the beginning.
When the defendant can produce a credible explanation that
accounts for the decision, the inference of status influence is
weakened and the causal inquiry sharpened such that the
factfinder can evaluate the likely influence of each explanation
on the decision-for example, by examining each factor more
carefully.
But Hicks allows for no compelled correction of any
attribution mistakes resulting from cognitive biases formed by
supporting an individual's assumed group characteristics than to find
contradictory evidence.... [Wihenever one is confronted with the need to
interpret the behavior of members of a particular group en masse, there will be
little opportunity to observe behavior that conflicts with the group's assumed
characteristics.
Id.
233. As Rebecca White and Linda Krieger explain,
A stereotype is best understood as a type of schema. A schema, in turn, is
best understood as a "knowledge structure," a network of interrelated elements
representing a person's knowledge, beliefs, experiences (both direct and
vicarious), and expectancies relating to the schematized object.
Cognitive stereotypes often function not as consciously held beliefs, but as
implicit expectancies. Through the mediation of various mental processes,
functioning largely outside of conscious awareness, a stereotype, like an
invidiously motivated supervisor reporting to his superior, covertly biases the
data on which a social judgment will be made, skewing that judgment in a
stereotype-reinforcing direction.
White & Krieger, supra note 4, at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
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the now-unconstrained causal-attribution judgments. Instead,
the Court has unleashed the factfinder into a world of causal
inquiry that is subject to the very biases, stereotypes, and
misconceptions that underlie the discrimination of which the
plaintiff complains.235 After the inference of status influence
"drops out of the picture," or no longer binds the factfinder to
assess its role in the decision, the causal judgment need not rest
in any factual grounding, particularly once the defendant's
reasons have been proven false.236 The factflnder may venture
untoward into his or her own a priori world knowledge, which
social psychologists have warned tends to subject the inquiry to
the very biases that might have cost the plaintiff her job in the
first place.237 On the other hand, if the factflnder was forced to
examine status and examine the asserted reason independently,
the risk of bias would be significantly reduced, and the ultimate
causal judgment would be rooted in normative and factual
reality.
B. Stereotype Vulnerability in Group Comparisons
Although Hicks hints at the vulnerability of the Court's
evidentiary structures to cognitive biases and mistakes, one need
not look far to detect the realization of these biases in both
discriminatory intent and impact cases. Recall that comparative
reasoning, usually via the "similarly situated" heuristic, is one of
the predominant causal mechanisms used in both intent and
234. Refer to notes 222-23 supra and accompanying text (discussing the
permissibility of an inference of discrimination by the factfinder).
235. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New
Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1996) (stating that, as a result
of Hicks, "if a case is put to a fact finder without direct evidence supporting either the
proffered reasons or intentional discrimination..., the fact finder's verdict will be a
referendum on the fact finder's perceived prevalence of intentional discrimination in
society").
236. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) (stating that once
the burden of production has been met by the defendant, the presumptions raised by the
plaintiffs prima facie case are no longer valid, and the factfinder is free to proceed on his
own beliefs); see also Chambers, supra note 235, at 41-44 (contending that once an
employee has disproved the employer's given explanations, "the factfinder's interpretation
will become speculation centered on unproffered reasons" and "will be based on the
factfinder's life experiences").
237. Linda Krieger makes this point as well. The initial presumption of status,
flawed though it may have been, at least served to control the otherwise
unrestrained biases about what might have caused the employer's
action.... [Without it], jurors can be expected to rely either on the relative
salience of the competing explanations or on whatever a priori causal theory
they find most representative of the situation at hand.
Krieger, supra note 6, at 1226.
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impact cases to generate explanations for the challenged action
or outcomes.238 This reasoning process allows defendants (and
plaintiffs) to search for possible distinctions that would explain
why individuals from different status groups have been
disparately impacted or treated. However, as researchers have
illustrated, when these distinctions involve explaining
differential outcomes or decisions involving statuses such as race
or gender, there is a tendency, either at the subconscious level or
through conscious manipulation, to rely on well-entrenched or
learned biases and stereotypes about the interests, capabilities,
and attributes of different social groups. When these
explanations are out in the open, trial courts have the
opportunity to probe them for any underlying cognitive biases
but often do not, and reviewing courts, lacking the firsthand
observation of the trial court, fail to see the underlying
stereotype or bias embedded in these otherwise facially neutral
explanations.
Consider, for example, the Court's interpretation of a
defendant's race- or gender-segregated workforce as an
expression of the status group's own "choice" or lack of interest in
the higher paid work.239 This is a commonly invoked status-
neutral explanation in employment discrimination cases that is
offered in response to evidence demonstrating a racial or gender
disparity, notwithstanding similarly situated qualifications
between status groups.24 ° As Wards Cove illustrates, the "lack of
interest" explanation is raised not by an actual comparison of the
interest between the two different status groups, but rather from
the cognitive process of looking for any factors that might
distinguish the treatment or impact on the groups.24' We know
that this comparative exercise is vulnerable to biases about the
abilities, characteristics, and expectations for different groups.
As in Wards Cove, courts tend to base comparisons on "broad
assumptions about [the] group with respect to an intangible
238. Refer to Part III.B supra.
239. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1988).
240. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1759 (1990) ("Since 1967, employers have
sought to justify patterns of sex and race segregation in their workforces by arguing that
these patterns resulted not from any actions they had taken, but rather from women's
and minorities' own lack of interest in higher-paying nontraditional jobs." (footnote
omitted)).
241. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54 (discussing the distinguishing feature of
nonskilled cannery workers only).
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quality that eludes objective measurement (their 'interest' in the
work)."
24 2
Professor Vicki Schultz has shown that district courts'
widespread acceptance of lack of interest as an explanation for an
employer's sex-segregated workforce in pattern and practice
cases often rests not on statistical data showing that women did
not apply for nontraditional jobs in representative numbers, but
rather "on conventional images of women as 'feminine' and
nurturing, unsuited for the vicious competition" of the male-
dominated employment positions.243 As one court has opined,"'common practical knowledge"' was enough upon which to base
the conclusion that certain work is not attractive to women; it
further concluded that "'this is a fact of life that an Act of
Congress cannot overcome.' 244 Another lower court, using the
same reasoning as the Wards Cove Court, has found that, in the
absence of evidence that women ever applied for the jobs, the
most likely explanation for the longstanding pattern of sex
segregation in defendant's workforce was the women's own lack
of interest.2 45 That court concluded that "although the plaintiff
242. Schultz, supra note 240, at 1778 (concluding that courts upholding the
explanation "seem to engage in precisely the sort of [stereotypes]" that are being
challenged).
243. Id. at 1753. Professor Schultz further explains that even anecdotal evidence-
for example, the testimony of women or minority members-that purports to measure a
status group's lack of interest in work may be problematic because it may not represent
the group's interests, but rather may simply serve to reinforce the generalizations or
stereotypes about the group. Id. at 1797. "Judges have no way of discovering ... whether
the relative proportions of women and men in the [qualified labor pool] accurately reflect
the relative proportions of women and men who are interested in the work." Id. at 1797-
98. As Professor Schultz explains,
[Judges] turn to anecdotal evidence as a way out of this dilemma. But anecdotal
evidence merely reproduces this same uncertainty. With enough resources, a
good plaintiffs lawyer can always find some women who were interested in the
work. On the other hand, a good management lawyer can probably also find at
least a few women willing to say that they were not interested in the work.
Because there is no way of verifying whether the plaintiffs' or the employer's
witnesses are representative of the larger pool of eligible women, anecdotal
evidence gets the court no closer to determining what proportion of the women in
the pool were interested in the work. Even if this problem could be surmounted,
there would still be no way of determining what proportion of men in the pool
were interested in the work. Thus, anecdotal evidence does not and cannot
reveal whether the eligible women were sufficiently less interested than the men
to explain the degree of female underrepresentation.
Id. at 1798.
244. Id. at 1784 (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Mead Food, Inc., 466 F.
Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1977)).
245. See id.
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may call this stereotype female classification, the Court has not
seen females clamoring to work in such jobs."246
Uncritical acceptance of explanations based upon
distinctions between social groups clearly sidesteps the
normative work required in antidiscrimination law. Determining
whether the proffered explanation is neutral or pretextual
requires an evaluative exercise that assesses the proximity of
status beliefs and influences on, or in, the proffered explanation.
For instance, the Court's own normative commitments counsel
that reliance on differences between the genders or races cannot
legitimately rest on stereotypes, gender roles, or outmoded beliefs
about the abilities and interests of different status groups.247
When examining a proffered explanation for differential
treatment that, at first glance, appears to rest on status
considerations, the factfinder should evaluate the explanations
for their reliance on, or fostering of, these status harms. In other
words, the causal assessment should inquire into the relationship
between status influences-prejudice or animus against a status
group, stereotypical assumptions about the group, or
manifestation of historical and social markers of status
difference-and the asserted explanation of the decisionmaker.
Courts, however, have not always avoided this evaluative
exercise. For example, during the late 1960s and the early 1970s,
some courts resisted explanations based on a "lack of interest" or
failure of historically excluded racial groups or women to apply
for higher paying, nontraditional jobs.248 By examining the
history of exclusion and the behavior of employers, many early
federal courts instead attributed the failure of minorities to apply
for higher paying jobs to the deterrent effect created by this
history and behavior, reflected in part by the presence of a
segregated workforce. 24' The U.S. Supreme Court, in an earlier
246. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Korn Indus., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 954, 959
(D.S.C. 1978)).
247. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) ("[Gleneralizations about
'the way women are'.., no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (noting, in a case invalidating a city plan designed to remedy
past discrimination, that strict scrutiny' is used to analyze gender- and race-based
classifications to ensure that the classifications are not motivated by stereotypes).
248. See Schultz, supra note 240, at 1771-72 (summarizing the courts'
acknowledgment that "where a historically discriminatory labor market had relegated
minorities to the lowest-paid, most menial positions, it was legally (and morally)
indefensible for employers to attempt to attribute racial segregation in their workforce to
minorities' own job preferences").
249. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 240, at 1771-73 (recounting the lower courts'
application of the "futility doctrine" in race discrimination cases in the early 1970s, which
1528 [41:5
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
pattern and practice case, also rejected the lack of interest
explanation for racial disparities for this reason:
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimination
by a sign reading "Whites Only" on the hiring-office door,
his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the
sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The
same message can be communicated to potential applicants
more subtly but just as clearly by an employer's actual
practices-by his consistent discriminatory treatment of
actual applicants, by the manner in which he publicizes
vacancies, his recruitment techniques, his responses to
casual or tentative inquiries, and even by the racial or
ethnic composition of that part of his work force from which
he has discriminatorily excluded members of minority
250groups.
Few federal courts, including the Supreme Court, would reason
this way today.25'
More recently, courts have critically evaluated proffered
explanations for striking jurors of certain racial and ethnic
groups for status biases and stereotypes embedded in those
explanations. For example, in United States v. Bishop,252 a
prosecutor argued that he did not strike an African-American
juror because of her race but rather because "she lived in
Compton, a poor and violent community whose residents are
likely to be anesthetized to such violence and more likely to think
that the police probably used excessive force."253 The Ninth
Circuit found this explanation to be pretextual (not race neutral)
because it "both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and
pernicious stereotypes."54 However, most courts have been less
presumed that "even if minorities had failed to apply in representative numbers, this did
not signal any lack of interest in the work, but rather a sense of futility created by the
employer's history of discrimination").
250. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977). However, the
Court initially refused to presume that all minority employees would have applied for the
higher paying jobs and instead required each minority nonapplicant to prove that he or
she would have applied to be a line-driver in the absence of the company's discriminatory
policy. Id. at 368-71.
251. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273, 1281-82 (11th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the district court's reasoning that a small percentage of women
applying for server jobs in an establishment with no female servers was probable because
women viewed applying for such jobs as "futile" in light of the restaurant's reputation for
not hiring women and finding that the failure of the restaurant to correct its
discriminatory "public image" should not subject it to disparate impact liability).
252. 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992).
253. Id. at 825 (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Id.; accord Johnson v. Love, 40 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting a
prosecutor's explanation that a young African-American woman would be less likely to
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vigorous and more uneven in their ability or willingness to
evaluate proffered explanations critically for their embedded
bias.255
As time carries society away from the most egregious and
open period of discrimination against historically excluded status
groups, courts tend to be much less scrutinizing and suspicious of
disparate treatment and outcomes involving those groups.256 The
uncritical acceptance of status distinctions and differences are
instead too often accepted as a matter of common knowledge, as a
natural and static reality in our society.2"7 Moreover, given the
popular belief that discrimination is largely a phenomenon of the
past, it is increasingly difficult for courts to see when and how
"discrimination" manifests itself in society today.258 Having set up
an evidentiary framework that acknowledges the persistence,
and even stubbornness, of status influences on decisionmakers
and decisionmaking outcomes, courts have stubbornly failed to
convict an African-American defendant as not sufficiently race-neutral because it was
based on the assumption that an African-American woman's objectivity would be
impaired because of her race).
255. In United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 634 (1st Cir. 1994), the court upheld the
use of a peremptory challenge to strike the only juror with a Spanish surname in a drug
conspiracy case in which all defendants had Spanish surnames. The prosecutor explained
that the reason for the strike was because the woman worked as a receptionist at the
city's housing authority and, as such, that she may have had more contact with "seeing
drugs in BHA operated apartments." Id. Although the court recognized that "inner city
exposure to drugs is quite susceptible to impermissible use as a proxy for the race-based
exercises of peremptory challenges," it nevertheless reasoned that suspicion of exposure to
drugs might as well have motivated the prosecutor to challenge a nonminority juror. Id.
at 635 (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent evidence that a similarly situated
white juror-one who worked or lived in close proximity to drug use-was not struck, the
court was disinclined to find that the peremptory challenge was influenced by racial
considerations. Id.; see also United States v. Maseratti, 1 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1993)
(allowing a prosecutor to strike a Hispanic woman because the prosecutor's "'experience in
Hispanic culture'" told him that a woman is used to doing "what the male in the species is
telling her to do"); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding
the exclusion of African-American jurors for affiliation "with black activist groups" in a
case in which racial discrimination was alleged and not all black jurors were excluded).
256. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See". White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 988-89 (1993) ("The
Court's discriminatory intent rule... treats as blameworthy the form of race
discrimination most common in the past but refuses to regard with suspicion the
unconscious discrimination that is at least as significant a cause of the oppression of black
people today.").
257. See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR
JUSTICE (2003) (making this point in a larger context); see also GLENN C. LoURy, THE
ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 16-31 (2002) (noting the ubiquity of "self-confirming"
racial categorizations and stereotypes that are uncritically relied upon by decisionmakers
across society).
258. See Flagg, supra note 256, at 988 (concluding that the Court's reluctance to
consider unconscious discrimination is a reflection of society's overall perception that
racism is a problem of the past).
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recognize instances in which the remnants of historical bias may
lurk.
C. Selection Bias in Comparative Analysis
As the previous subpart discussed, courts need to monitor
vigilantly the way that stereotypes and cognitive biases
regarding the expected abilities, roles, and interests of different
social groups can influence causal explanations generated by
comparative exercises that seek to identify distinctive features
among social groups. A less obvious or transparent influence of
these biases is the way in which they can distort the comparative
process itself by influencing the selection of the "causal
comparison" or causal background."' When this occurs, the
comparative analysis can be vulnerable to the influence of status
bias, rendering problematic any conclusion that is drawn from
the comparative exercise.26 Courts are apt to miss this type of
subtle bias, especially when it results from their own reasoning
process, because the contrastive, similarly situated exercise itself
is too often mistakenly equated with the causal inquiry at the
heart of antidiscrimination law.261 Because this contrastive
reasoning is explanatory and focused on sufficiency, it will miss
much of the status evaluation required for causal judgments to
avoid entrenching the very bias they are seeking to uproot.
As researchers have shown, selection of the causal
comparison is heavily influenced by certain characteristics or
features of the targeted subject (for example, a black or female
plaintiff) and the subject's (im)mutability in people's minds.
Recall, for instance, that the model actor fallacy can distort
causal attributions by influencing the selection of a causal
comparison that reflects the "typicality" of the status group in
question. That is, different causal comparisons are apt to be
adopted for women depending upon whether the activity or task
in question is deemed typical or atypical for their status group. 262
259. See McGill, supra note 40, at 701 (explaining that causal explanations vary as a
function of selection bias in choosing the "causal background"-for example, events,
individuals, statistical data-against which the occurrence is compared).
260. See id. (finding that a person's conclusion about a situation's cause depends on
the causal background chosen by the person and will thus always be influenced by the
person's previous history and biases).
261. Refer to notes 255-57 supra and accompanying text (discussing the one-sided
comparative analysis in which courts engage when determining whether discrimination
was "because of" race).
262. Refer to notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text (discussing the "model actor
fallacy"). That status category may affect the comparison adopted is consistent with norm
theory, which explains that "factors that are exceptional are more likely to be modified in
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For instance, causal comparisons for men engaged in a
traditionally male-oriented activity would likely be other men,
and comparisons for women would tend to focus on traditionally
female-oriented activities or categories."' Thus, causal
explanations for why women are not included in a particular
professional arena or successful at a particular male activity will
be particularly sensitive to expectations about what gender
typically succeeds at, or belongs in, that professional arena.
Further, those expectations will shape the selection of
comparison background, which in turn can dictate causal
explanations and attributions. 64
This type of selection bias is illustrated in Feeney, the equal
protection case involving a challenge to a veterans' preference
law that overwhelmingly benefited men in securing civil service
appointments.2 2 Recall that central to the Court's conclusion that
the law was not discriminatory on the basis of gender, despite its
"devastating" impact on women,266 was its comparison of whether
men and women were similarly situated vis-A-vis the
preference. 267 The Court concluded that "too many men" were
disadvantaged by being in the nonveteran group "to permit the
inference that the statute is but a pretext for preferring men over
women."268 Rather, the Court concluded, based on the exercise of
comparing the number of men and women in the nonveteran
category, that the legislature's purpose was instead to prefer"veterans" over "nonveterans"-a status-neutral distinction
without constitutional significance.269
At first glance, the Court's rationale seems eminently
reasonable. If men and women are similarly situated vis-A-vis the
statutory disadvantage of which plaintiff complains, then there
would seem to be no intentional discrimination, at least on the
basis of gender. However, consider that another comparative
exercise was also available for the Court to assess whether the
legislative choice to give veterans and their families employment
preferences might have been influenced by gender (or more
particularly, by gender stereotypes or bias). One might have
people's mental representation of events than factors that are typical or routine." Grier &
McGill, supra note 78, at 548-49.
263. Refer to Part II.B.2.a supra.
264. Refer to Part II.B.2 supra (discussing the role of the comparison background in
shaping expectations).
265. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
266. See id. at 260 (citing the district court's finding).
267. Id. at 68-72, 275-78.
268. Id. at 275.
269. Id. at 275, 280.
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asked whether men and women were similarly situated vis-A-vis"veteran" status-the statutory advantage of which the plaintiff
complains. This analysis would dictate a starkly different
conclusion given that more than 98% of the veterans were men,
while only 1.8% were women. 7 ' When comparing men and
women in the advantaged class of veterans, one might reason in
the opposite direction: Too many women are affected by the
veteran's preference to allow the conclusion that the statute is
not "a pretext for preferring men over women."27'
It is doubtful that this would have ended the analysis of the
Feeney Court, as it went on to examine the legislative history of
the statute to conclude that "nothing in the record demonstrates
that this preference for veterans was originally devised or
subsequently reenacted because it would accomplish the
collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined
place in the Massachusetts Civil Service."272 But, to be sure, this
latter conclusion was made much easier once the Court
determined that the distinction on which the statute was based
was neutral regarding gender and not a pretext for gender
considerations. In this sense, the comparative exercise sharply
defined, and perhaps determinatively influenced, the Court's
ultimate conclusion that neither gender bias nor stereotypes
were at work.
In other words, a sort of "reversing the groups" tes27-a
type of counterfactual exercise-would force the factfinder to
employ the similarly situated exercise to the other veterans
group. The contrasting and opposite results from this comparison
should prompt a further evaluation of why, although they are
similarly situated vis-h-vis nonveteran status, men and women
are not nearly similarly situated vis-A-vis veterans' status. In
fact, their stark dissimilarity in relation to the very intention of
the statute-to advantage veterans (not to disadvantage
nonveterans)-should prompt the evaluative question: "Is
veteran status historically equated with typical male traits?" The
reason this question is important is because it gets right at the
heart of the status-based discrimination-reliance on the very
270. Id. at 270.
271. Id. at 275.
272. Id. at 279 & n.24 (using the Arlington Heights factors to examine the historical
and legislative context surrounding adoption of the preference).
273. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935, 956-57 (1989) (proposing a test for discriminatory intent). "Suppose the
adverse effects of the challenged government decision fell on whites instead of blacks, or
on men instead of women. Would the decision have been different? If the answer is yes,
then the decision was made with discriminatory intent." Id.
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notions, ideas, and mechanisms that historically excluded certain
status groups from many arenas of civil society. If veterans'
status is historically associated with male traits, and women
have historically been excluded from this status, it seems
implausible that "outmoded notions" and "stereotypes" about the
proper roles of men and women could not have influenced the
legislative choice.274
V. THE EROSION OF NORMATIVE CAUSALITY
At this point it is tempting to suggest doctrinal reforms that
would enable factfinders and reviewing courts to engage in a
more controlled, evaluative analysis that would constrain
permissive comparative analyses and to stem factfinders' and
courts' propensity to rely on cognitive biases.275 As others have
pointed out, social science research has shown that cognitive
biases can be detected and replaced when conscious, controlled
reasoning processes are used.276 Similarly, researchers studying
causal processes likewise suggest that following up comparative
analysis with a counterfactual exercise-in a sense a more
controlled or constrained reasoning process-can also control for
cognitive bias and limit its effect on causal judgments.277 But I
believe that these reforms would likely prove futile. So much of
plaintiffs' ability to prove status influence, given the increasing
subtlety of contemporary discrimination, lies in the strength of
274. As David Strauss cogently argues,
[Tihe distinctive traits that make veterans seem so deserving are associated
with being male in somewhat the same way (although not to the same degree)
that the capacity to be pregnant is associated with being a woman and the status
of a group historically subject to discrimination is associated with being black.
Membership in the warrior class has historically been linked with maleness.
Willingness to undergo "the sacrifice of military service" is generally thought of
as a male virtue, especially where the more dramatic forms of sacrifice, such as
physical ordeals and danger, are concerned.
Id. at 1002.
275. See, e.g., Jodi Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 737 (1995) (arguing that legal
decisionmakers must become more conscious of statuses like race and gender in order to
resist falling into the habit of relying on cognitive stereotypes); Gary Blasi, Advocacy
Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241,
1276 (2002) (suggesting the activation of antidiscrimination norms to control cognitive
bias, which might be accomplished through argument, jury instruction, or implicit
invocation of antiprejudice norms).
276. Krieger, supra note 6, at 1246 ("[Various experiments indicate that carefully
specifying evaluative criteria and providing decisionmakers with a large amount of
information on those criteria can reduce intergroup bias."); see also Armour, supra note
275, at 760-61 (citing and discussing similar studies).
277. McGill & Klein, supra note 15, at 903-04.
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the normative assumptions underlying the prima facie case. Once
courts began to lose faith or confidence in these assumptions, as
this Part will show they have, the entire evidentiary structure
built on top of them is weakened beyond the point that doctrinal
reforms alone can remedy.
Recall that the Court has set up evidentiary frameworks
that allow an inference of status influence based on a
counterfactual heuristic that posits what outcomes and
decisionmaking processes would resemble in a nondiscriminatory
world and then deems deviations from those procedures and
outcomes to be indicative of status influence."8  This
counterfactual exercise is itself based in a number of normative
expectations or assumptions about the existence, prevalence, and
operation of discrimination in a number of contexts. These
assumptions are (1) that history is a salient indicator of the
tendency of decisionmakers to be affected by existing attitudes
and biases about status groups (historical saliency); (2) that
groups are relatively equal in their abilities and interests in
seeking out political, social, and economic opportunities, and thus
absent discrimination wide disparities in the distribution of those
opportunities are unexpected (group parity); and (3) that
discrimination is not episodic or isolated but is rather a systemic
threat that is likely to manifest itself where decisionmakers have
the most discretion (persistent bias threat).79
The normative assumptions underlying evidentiary structures
in intent and impact cases have served to guide and constrain
causal judgments in two ways. First, these assumptions have
helped identify the type of circumstantial evidence that can be most
indicative of status discrimination. For instance, the historical roots
or background of contemporary decisions can make salient certain
types of evidence-like disparate, adverse impacts on historically
mistreated groups-that might otherwise seem irrelevant or
indeterminate. As such, it has not always been easy for defendants
or courts to dismiss historical evidence, especially when it implied a
historical consistency in the manner that a status group was
currently being treated or impacted. Second, these assumptions
have grounded causal judgments in a group-equality norm that self-
consciously undermines the essentialist status distinctions
traditionally invoked to justify discriminatory treatment. These
assumptions have thus functioned to constrain and restrain
explanations for disparate treatment and outcomes that, given their
278. Refer to Part III.A supra.
279. Refer to Part III.A supra.
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historical and social context, too closely correlated with traditional
stereotypes and markers of a group's social status.
In this way, the normative assumptions underlying the prima
facie cases of discrimination often made it difficult to explain stark
group disparities and treatment on status-neutral grounds,
particularly when they were contextualized as the historical legacy
of more overt forms of discrimination. For instance, in Rogers, the
historical context was crucial in allowing the court to draw the
causal link between the adoption of the at-large voting system and
the disproportionate exclusion of African-Americans from public
office, boards, and committees.28 ° This history was useful, the Court
reasoned, in
drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination,
particularly in cases such as this one where the evidence
shows that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized
[in the past], that they were abandoned when enjoined by
courts or made illegal by civil rights legislation, and that they
were replaced by laws and practices which, though neutral on
281their face, serve to maintain the status quo.
As this Part illustrates, because so much of the strength
and effectiveness of the evidentiary structures has rested on
this type of contextualized reasoning and its underlying
normative assumptions, the erosion of the assumptions has
had a deleterious effect on discrimination plaintiffs' ability to
uncover and prove status bias. In other words, the guidance
and constraints under which the Court previously operated
when reasoning about discrimination are noticeably absent in
its most recent antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Consistent
with the illustrations of the previous Part, causal judgments
are increasingly made in an acontextual, ahistorical realm
that presupposes a sort of zero-sum status game that is loath
to find either historical victims or contemporary perpetrators.
A. The Decreasing Relevance of History and the "Inevitability" of
Inequality
Much has been written about the Court's infamous rejection
of an equal protection challenge to the Georgia capital sentencing
process in McCleskey v. Kemp.2 2 The constitutional challenge was
280. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623-27 (1982).
281. Id. at 625; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting the
variety of cases in which discriminatory impact "for all practical purposes demonstrate[s]
unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult
to explain on nonracial grounds").
282. 481 U.S. 279, 298, 313 (1987).
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based on a sophisticated regression study that demonstrated
significant racial disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty, both by the race of the victim and, to a lesser degree, by
the defendant's race.8 3 But it is worth taking another look at the
Court's reasoning in McCleskey to illustrate the fundamental
shift in the Court's normative understanding of status
discrimination since its evidentiary frameworks were initially
adopted.
McCleskey sought to establish the presence of racial
discrimination in the imposition of his death sentence by using a
sophisticated statistical regression analysis that took into
account some 230 nonracial variables that could have explained
stark racial disparities in more than 2000 murder cases in
Georgia on nonracial grounds. 24 Even after controlling for thirty-
nine nonracial aggravating and mitigating factors that are
typically influential in death penalty cases, the study found that
someone like McCleskey, an African-American charged with
killing a white person, was 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced
to death than a defendant charged with killing an African-
American.8 5 The study concluded that race was as powerful an
influence in the imposition of the death penalty as formal
statutory criteria, if not more.2 8 6
Additionally, the study introduced by McCleskey found that
the most significant racial disparities occurred where the most
discretion lay in the capital decisionmaking processes.' This was
283. Id. at 286.
284. Id. at 286-87.
285. Id. at 287. This data was supplemented by evidence specific to the county in
which McCleskey was sentenced. David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability"
of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention,
Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 366 (1994). Though based on
smaller samples, this county data was as revealing as the statewide data. See id. at 366
n.29 (reporting the findings of the author of McCleskey's study and noting that after
adjustment for the different levels of criminal culpability, the race-of-victim disparity in
the Fulton County cases was twenty-eight percentage points and in the category where
McCleskey's race was located, the race-of-victim disparity was forty points).
286. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For instance, the race of
the victim was a variable nearly as influential as a prior conviction for armed robbery,
rape, or even murder. Id. at 355 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (pointing out that a prior
conviction for armed robbery, rape, or murder increases one's odds of being sentenced to
death by a factor of 4.9-as opposed to an increase of 4.3 for murdering a white victim).
Additionally, the race-of-victim variable proved to be more influential in the imposition of
the death penalty than whether the defendant was a prime mover in the homicide, a
statutory aggravating factor. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 287 n.5 (citing the study author's argument that the most dramatic
racial disparities were in the "mid-range" cases, where the decisionmakers have a real
choice whether to impose the death penalty). Based on these disparities in the midrange
cases, the study's author concluded that "if there's room for the exercise of discretion, then
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significant in large part because the study's author concluded
that McCleskey's case fell in the midrange level of aggravated
homicide, in which racial factors are more likely than not to play
a significant role and where the largest statistical disparities
lie.288
McCleskey's showing should have resonated with a Court
that had established in two distinct lines of precedent that
statistical disparity evidence was indicative of status influence
and, indeed, of intentional discrimination, particularly where the
most common reasons for disparate treatments and outcomes
were accounted (or controlled) for in the statistical comparisons.
The inference of status from this evidence was partially based on
the expectation that, given our history and experience with
status bias, discretionary decisionmaking processes are
vulnerable to the influence of status bias and "permit[] 'those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' 289 It was also
based on the assumption that, absent systemic discrimination or
bias, similarly situated groups and individuals would be
similarly treated and impacted.290 Setting aside the Court's
strained attempt to distinguish these two lines of precedent and
their application in the death penalty context,2 9' the Court carved
out a larger normative stance that virtually reverses all of the
assumptions underlying its previous evidentiary frameworks in
equal protection cases.
The rejection of McCleskey's evidence as indicative of status
influence in his case-or in the Georgia system as a whole-is
facilitated first and foremost by the Court's dismissal of the
historical context that rendered that evidence salient. This
history indicated that "for many years, Georgia operated openly
and formally precisely the type of dual system the evidence
shows is still effectively in place. The criminal law expressly
differentiated between crimes committed by and against blacks
and whites, distinctions whose lineage traced back to the time of
the [racial] factors begin to play a role." Id. (alteration in original).
288. Id. (finding that 14.4% of the black-victim midrange cases resulted in the death
penalty while 34.4% of the white-victim cases did).
289. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)).
290. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 & n.20 (1977); see
also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(concluding that the statistical disparity of salaries paid to blacks as compared to
similarly situated whites, taking into account four independent variables, supported a
finding of pattern and practice discrimination with respect to salaries). Refer to Part
III.A.1 supra.
291. I have elsewhere detailed the Court's reasoning and its flaws at length. See
Foster, supra note 3, at 1144-61.
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slavery."292 In other words, the history of Georgia's system of
crime and punishment categorized along racial lines and
ideology, just as social scientists indicate individuals do today,
albeit automatically and unconsciously. The statistical study
captured in objective terms what we know (and the Court had
consistently acknowledged) to be true both as a social and
psychological reality and as a historical matter.293
Yet stripped of the historical understanding and context,
evidence illustrating stark racial outcomes in highly
discretionary decisionmaking processes may be troubling but
ultimately must be tolerated in any imperfect system of justice.
At least this is the Court's reasoning as it distances itself and
equal protection doctrine from much of the history that gave
birth to it. By the majority's calculation, the virtually unbroken
historical treatment of blacks and whites in Georgia's system of
crime and punishment is just that-history. This history,
although formally relevant (the Court perfunctorily cited
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. for
this point) ultimately "has little probative value" unless it is
"reasonably contemporaneous with the challenged decision.
Genuflecting to the "undeniable" history of racial discrimination
in this country, the majority nevertheless is ready to leave this
history, finally, behind us.295  Requiring that history be"contemporaneous" with the decision, in other words, is another
way of rendering the history all but irrelevant, because its utility
is exactly in interpreting contemporary events against past
practices and patterns.
In important ways, the other two assumptions, group parity
and persistent bias threat, hinge unmistakably on the historical
salience of race and racial distinctions. Without this history, it is
unproblematic for us to assume that different groups of people in
society are (or should be) differently situated and deserving of
292. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 329-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (chronicling at
length the history of the Georgia death penalty system).
293. Indeed, the dissent echoes exactly this point:
Evaluation of McCleskey's evidence cannot rest solely on the numbers
themselves. We must also ask whether the conclusion suggested by those
numbers is consonant with our understanding of history and human experience.
Georgia's legacy of a race-conscious criminal justice system, as well as this
Court's own recognition of the persistent danger that racial attitudes may affect
criminal proceedings, indicates that McCleskey's claim is not a fanciful product
of mere statistical artifice.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 298 n.20.




different treatment and impacts. That is, our suspicion about
adverse treatment or outcomes that "correlate" with status is
largely based on our collective history and experience with
invidious treatment on the basis of that status. Without this
history, a group parity or egalitarian norm lacks the requisite
constitutional imperative necessary to render the treatment or
outcomes damaging to our social system-and so the Court
reasons in McCleskey. Having rendered the history of racialized
criminal justice in Georgia nonprobative, the Court easily
concluded that "at most, the Baldus [statistical] study indicates a
discrepancy that appears to correlate with race."296 But this is not
problematic in an acontextual, dehistorized evaluation of the
evidence, as indicated by the Court's ultimate conclusion that"apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system."297 Racial disparities have all but been
stripped of any particularized social meaning when the historical
saliency of race-and even the formal discriminatory treatment
on the basis of race-has been wiped clean from the slate of
causal reasoning.
The Court just as potently rejects the third assumption that
the threat of racial bias is persistent in discretionary processes.
Recall that the Court has inferred from statistical disparities the
existence of intentional bias where the decisionmaker(s) cannot
explain the differential treatment or outcome reflected by the
disparities on neutral grounds.298 The Court's willingness to allow
this inference in criminal justice (jury exclusion) and
employment cases has also rested squarely on the shoulders of
historical and contemporary experience.299 We know from this
experience that the penchant to categorize and stereotype on the
basis of race and gender is more likely to occur in uncontrolled or
discretionary situations. ° Yet in McCleskey, this discretion
becomes a shield rather than a sword against judicial scrutiny for
bias: "Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious." 0 ' Citing other constitutional"safeguards" designed to minimize racial bias in the criminal
296. Id. at 312.
297. Id. at 313.
298. Refer to Part III.A.1 (discussing previous instances in which the Court has
presumed discrimination, absent counterproof from the defendant, where expected
outcomes were not reached).
299. Refer to Part III.A supra (expounding upon cases in which the Court used
historical experience to infer discriminatory impact).
300. Refer to notes 120, 289 supra and accompanying text.
301. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
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process, such as the prohibition on race-based jury selection and
selective prosecution, and the "benefits of discretion" in the
criminal process, the Court simply concludes that whatever
threat of racial bias that may lurk in the sentencing process (as
indicated by the statistical study) is not significant enough to be
of constitutional concern.302
Even if we were to accept the unique nature of the capital
sentencing process and system as a bona fide reason for rejecting
its own precedent, we can still find elsewhere in the Court's
recent jurisprudence evidence of the erosion of confidence in the
evidentiary frameworks that are set up to detect discrimination.
The Court's contrarianism in the face of its own normative and
evidentiary commitments is clearly on display in two opinions
that followed closely on the heels of McCleskey. °3 These latter
decisions reflect the same reversal of fortune in the ways that
courts reason about the causal inquiry at the heart of
discrimination cases. Together with McCleskey, these cases leave
very little doubt that there has been a significant, even seismic,
shift over time in the juridical assumptions about discrimination.
B. Blinded Agency and the Redemption of Innocence
One need look no further than the Court's recent
employment discrimination cases to confirm the shift in its
assumptions about the nature of contemporary status bias and
discrimination. Recall that in pattern and practice and disparate
impact cases, the Court assumed a reasonable expectation "that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work
force more or less representative of the racial[,] ethnic[, and
gender] composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired."" ' This was an assumption based on
a norm of status parity, which takes as its baseline the notion
that status bestows no inalterable differences in the talents,
interests, and abilities of individuals. The other assumption is
one of persistent status bias threat, which is based on the notion
302. See id.
In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the
fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits
that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study
does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting
the Georgia capital sentencing process.
Id.
303. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-24 (1993) (discussing
a change in the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643, 649-50 (1989).
304. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1976).
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that, absent invidious influences, employers should be able to
explain their decisions by reference to neutral considerations. As
we have seen, once the most common reasons for employment
actions are taken into account (or controlled for through the
prima facie case showing), the Court's evidentiary frameworks
treat the possibility of even subconscious bias lurking as a threat
in decisionmaking processes. This is particularly so given the
history (and contemporary reality) of labor market bias. For this
reason, requiring employers to retain records and to articulate
plausible reasons for the challenged employment action is a way
of checking or controlling the danger of status biases that
threaten to exert their influence on employment decisions.
Reading the Court's opinions in Hicks and Wards Cove
illustrates just how far the Court has distanced itself from the
normative assumptions that have previously guided and
governed the evidentiary frameworks in statutory intent and
impact cases. What is striking about the Court's reasoning in
both cases is the almost complete erasure of, and blindness to,
the historical and social context of status discrimination. In an
important sense, the Court has wiped the slate clean of any
remnants of historical bias or the ways in which this history has
left an unbroken legacy of differential treatment in contemporary
labor markets. There is a complete reversal of the presumption,
indeed, that discrimination operates often below the radar of
obvious racial indicia but nevertheless can manifest itself in the
irregularities of decisionmaking processes and deviations from
expected outcomes. Discrimination is now treated like a relic of
the past, difficult to unearth because its effects have largely
receded from the societal structures and institutions where its
influence was once thought to be so powerfully, yet subtly,
exerted.
In Hicks, the most dramatic move made by the Court in its
reversal of fortune for discrimination plaintiffs was the reduction
of the presumption of status influence from the plaintiffs prima
facie case showing to a mere "procedural device, designed only to
establish [the] order of proof and production,""5 one that is no
different than a host of other procedural rules that litter civil
procedure. Shorn of its normative underpinnings, the device
assumes absolutely nothing about the existence-not to mention
the persistence-of status bias threat in the labor market. It is as
if the Court has suddenly become blinded to the ways in which
status bias has historically and persistently shaped the labor
305. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521.
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market decisions and the preferences of individuals within it.
Without this larger historical and social context, then, employers
stand firmly outside of the web of historical, institutional, and
cognitive influences that account for the stubborn persistence of
status discrimination. As the Court sternly summed up in Hicks,
"Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot
prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment
action .... ,,30' Gone are the days when the Court held the
employer more accountable under its assumption that "when all
legitimate reasons ... have been eliminated as possible reasons
for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as
race."307
Wards Cove also reflects this blinded view of agency. 8 In
first conceptualizing the disparate impact cause of action, the
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power30 1 offered a very powerful
narrative about the ways in which historical and contemporary
discriminatory practices become entrenched in decisionmaking
processes that are "neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent" in ways that "operate to 'freeze' the status
quo."310 The plaintiffs prima facie showing that her status group
was adversely and disparately impacted by the employer's
decisionmaking process imported this sociohistorical
understanding of contemporary discrimination, which gave
salience and context to employment practices that, even in the
context of a period after the formal disestablishment of overt
discriminatory practices, bear a striking resemblance to those
shunned practices.
Whereas in Griggs the employer's segregated workforce
served to highlight the discriminatory nature of the employer's
practices, in Wards Cove a similarly highly segregated workforce
306. Id. at 523.
307. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Instead, it is now left
up to the factfinder to do the normative work underlying this assumption, a task ill suited
in most instances to individuals who have even less control or accountability in their
causal reasoning processes. Refer to Part III.A supra.
308. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Turning a blind eye to
the meaning and purpose of Title VII, the majority's opinion perfunctorily rejects a
longstanding rule of law and underestimates the probative value of evidence of a racially
stratified work force.").
309. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
310. Id. at 430. In Griggs, the Court explained how the employer's requirement of a
high school diploma and a standardized intelligence test, in the context of the historically
inferior education of African-Americans, caused the employer's workforce to remain
racially segregated even after the company ended formal segregation practices. Id.
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prompted the Court to distance itself from its sociohistorical
salience to the defendant's employment practice. In Griggs, the
employer's plant was organized into five operating departments,
but African-Americans were employed only in the labor
department, where the highest paying jobs paid less than the
lowest paying jobs in the other four departments. " ' After the
formal abandonment of its open racial segregation of employees,
the employer conditioned transfer into the higher paid
departments on a high school degree or intelligence test, both of
which "render[ed] ineligible a markedly disproportionate number
of [African-Americans]. " 12 The Court found these practices
discriminatory in light of both the larger historical and social
context-for example, the fact that blacks received inferior
education in the state and the lack of relevance of the test to job
performance-and the context of the employer's own segregated
workforce.313  Taken together, it was evident that the
requirements of a high school degree and intelligence test,
although "fair in form," were "discriminatory in operation."3 4
These facially neutral requirements both reinforced and reflected
the existing racial segregation and exclusion in the defendant's
workforce.315
The employer in Wards Cove similarly maintained a starkly
segregated workforce, not just in the stratification of jobs along
racial and ethnic lines, but also in the segregation of housing and
dining facilities by race and ethnicity.316 Yet instead of viewing
this segregation as indicative of the ways in which the structure
of defendant's workforce mimicked even the most overt forms of
segregation, the five-member majority cut it cleanly away from
the larger functioning of defendant's facially neutral employment
practices under challenge by the plaintiff. Indeed, the majority
deemed this segregation to'raise only the narrow legal question
of whether the defendant had intentionally segregated its
workforce, a curious inquiry given the difficulty of establishing
311. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427.
312. Id. at 429.
313. Id. at 430-31.
314. Id. at 431.
315. See id. at 432 (describing the requirements as "built in headwinds' for minority
groups").
316. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 649 (1989). Not only did the
predominantly white noncannery workers earn more than the predominantly nonwhite
cannery workers, but they also lived in separate dormitories and ate in separate mess
halls. Id.; see also id. at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that these




such intent. But more to the point, focusing on what the
segregation did not say about whether the employer intended to
treat these groups differently became a clear distraction from the
segregation's larger salience to the racialized nature of
defendant's employment practices, a nexus that was not difficult
to see in this case. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning is quite
telling:
Whatever the "resemblance" [that the employer's work
force has to a plantation economy], the unanimous view of
the lower courts in this litigation has been that [the
plaintiffs] did not prove that the canneries practice
intentional racial discrimination. Consequently, Justice
Blackmun's hyperbolic allegation that our decision in this
case indicates that this Court no longer "believes that race
discrimination ... against nonwhites ... is a problem in our
society, is inapt. Of course, it is unfortunately true that race
discrimination exists in our country. That does not mean,
however, that it exists at the canneries-or more precisely,
that it has been proved to exist at the canneries.
Indeed, Justice Stevens concedes that [the plaintiffs]
did not press before us the legal theories under which the
aspects of cannery life that he finds to most resemble a"plantation economy" might be unlawful. Thus, the question
here is not whether we "approve" of petitioner's
employment practices or the society that exists at the
canneries, but, rather, whether [the plaintiffs] have
properly established that these practices violate Title VII. 317
The majority's failure to consider the totality of defendant's
employment practices-the subjective hiring practices, the
racially stratified workforce, and the adverse wage effect of that
stratification-is a myopia that unfortunately characterizes
much of its recent reasoning about discrimination.
Ultimately, there is a narrative of innocence that permeates
the Court's view of racial equality and the role of decisionmakers
in whatever racial inequality exists in our society. This narrative
is exemplified by the lengths to which the Court went in both
Hicks and Wards Cove to shift the agency behind disparate
treatment and impact away from what it once understood as the
historical legacy and remnants of discrimination to more
innocent forces that would account for any status inequality that
might still exist. Consider, for instance, the Court's explanation
for why status discrimination is no longer an appropriate
317. Id. at 649 n.4 (citations omitted) (second and third alterations in original).
20051 1545
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
inference for an employer's failure to persuasively explain its
reasons for an adverse employment action against a plaintiff who
is otherwise qualified and available:
Assume that 40% of a business' work force are members of
a particular minority group, a group which comprises only
10% of the relevant labor market. An applicant, who is a
member of that group, applies for an opening for which he
is minimally qualified, but is rejected by a hiring officer of
that same minority group, and the search to fill the opening
continues. The rejected applicant files suit for racial
discrimination under Title VII, and before the suit comes to
trial, the supervisor who conducted the company's hiring is
fired. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has a prima
facie case, and under the dissent's interpretation of our law
not only must the company come forward with some
explanation for the refusal to hire (which it will have to try
to confirm out of the mouth of its now antagonistic former
employee), but the jury must be instructed that, if they find
that explanation to be incorrect, they must assess damages
against the company, whether or not they believe the
company was guilty of racial discrimination.318
In the first instance, this hypothetical reveals a normative
vision that the world in which we live is rooted in a contrafactual
assumption of equality between groups. That is, it places
remarkable faith in a status egalitarianism that is
contraindicated by most empirical evidence of the distribution of
racial and ethnic groups in labor markets. As importantly, it
reveals a seemingly prevalent fear in this society that innocent
whites, or innocent societal practices, will be blamed for
inequalities that have their origins in actions that are either the
alleged victim's fault or the responsibility of forces that no one
individual or institution should be held responsible for-in part
because of the historical and social complexity of the
phenomenon that gives rise to these forces.
A proffered causal explanation offered by the Court in Wards
Cove similarly reflects this theme of innocence. Recall that the
plaintiff demonstrated a racial disparity in defendant's workforce
between workers with similar, or fungible, skills.319 In rejecting this
disparity as indicative of the racial biases, the Court imagined
another, far more virtuous causal explanation for the disparity:
The peculiar facts of this case further illustrate why a
comparison between the percentage of nonwhite cannery
318. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1993) (citation omitted).
319. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54.
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workers and nonwhite noncannery workers is an improper
basis for making out a claim of disparate impact. Here, the
District Court found that nonwhites were"overrepresent[ed]" among cannery workers because
[defendants] had contracted with a predominantly nonwhite
union (local 37) to fill these positions. As a result, if
[defendants] (for some permissible reason) ceased using
local 37 as its hiring channel for cannery positions, it
appears (according to the District Court's findings) that the
racial stratification between the cannery and noncannery
workers might diminish to statistical insignificance. Under
the Court of Appeals' approach, therefore, it is possible that
with no change whatsoever in their hiring practices for
noncannery .workers... [defendants] could make
[plaintiffs'] prima facie case of disparate impact
"disappear."3 20
It is true that there surely exist many innocent, or non-
status-related, causes for disparate treatments and impacts. The
Court need not "see" discrimination lurking everywhere in order
to see that it continues to exist somewhere. But it is telling how
much trouble the Court seems to have in identifying status
discrimination anywhere, except in the overt use of race and
gender classifications for formally benign reasons (for example, to
assist historically disadvantaged groups). 2' This failure is
particularly noteworthy when considered against the Court's
history of identifying what it previously considered to be
important hallmarks of status discrimination. What accounts for
this myopia is undoubtedly complex and is perhaps subject to
contestation. But what cannot be ignored is the normative shift
in the Court's vision of status discrimination and its
(non)salience as a causal explanation for persistent group
disparities and treatment in society.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time to move beyond the debate in antidiscrimination
scholarship over the wisdom of a discriminatory intent versus a
disparate impact test. As this Article has argued, this debate has
obscured in important ways where the real normative work
occurs in antidiscrimination law. The question of whether race,
gender, or other protected status is the cause of (intentionally or
320. Id. at 654 (citation omitted) (first alteration in original).
321. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and




not) the disparate treatment of, or disparate impact on, an
individual or group is the central inquiry in both intent and
impact cases. Importantly, as this Article has shown, the Court
has employed similar causal heuristics to satisfy this inquiry in
both types of actions. By looking closely at these heuristics and
their evidentiary counterparts, we can see more clearly why
neither the discriminatory intent nor disparate impact cause of
action can remain fertile ground for relief by plaintiffs claiming
unfair discrimination.
This Article identified two key vulnerabilities in current
causal analysis in intent and impact cases that, despite the
availability of generous evidentiary mechanisms, render the
majority of discrimination cases highly likely.to be unsuccessful.
These vulnerabilities reflect significant shifts in both the way in
which courts have come to understand contemporary
discrimination and the assumptions that they hold about that
discrimination in our society. While many scholars have written
about the cognitive biases that can affect employment and other
types of decisionmaking that leads to status-based
discrimination, courts have not been particularly concerned or
scrutinizing of the ways in which those biases can infect
decisionmaking about whether discrimination has occurred in a
particular instance. More problematically, we have seen a steady
erosion of the normative understandings underlying the
evidentiary structures used to prove discrimination that have
been in place for the past few decades.
This erosion portends a far more fundamental civil rights
restoration project than has perhaps been contemplated by those
concerned about the decline in antidiscrimination law coverage
and protection. In the final analysis, this Article seeks to call
attention to the need for more fundamental reform, both in the
way that we perceive antidiscrimination jurisprudence and in the
types of solutions we seek for its sustainability in the face of
evolving patterns of discrimination. What these solutions should
look like is a subject for another article. In shifting the focus
toward causation, the hope is that future solutions will take up
the deeper challenges that constrain the ability of
antidiscrimination law to fulfill its potential.
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